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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three essays on odd-lot transactions.  The first essay 
investigates the role odd lot trades play in equity markets, as well as how this role has changed 
over three distinct time periods- 2010, 2007, and 2005.  In each of these time periods, we 
document the determinants of the proportions of odd lot transactions, the price contribution of 
odd lot trades, and the characteristics of odd lot trading on an intraday and intraweek basis.  
We find that odd lot transactions make up 8% of volume and 20-22% of trades.  We find that 
odd lot proportions as well as the determinants of odd lot proportions vary greatly over time 
and by listing venue.  We find that odd lot transactions contribute to price formation and this 
contribution varies over time and by listing venue, but has not increased over time.  Intraday 
patterns of odd lot proportions exist and have not been static over time.  Intraweek patterns of 
odd lot proportions exist and have remained fairly constant over our time periods. 
The purpose of the second essay is threefold.  First, we reexamine the relation between 
order imbalance and lagged, contemporaneous, and future returns documented by Chordia, 
Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002, 2004) with data containing Nasdaq trades from 2011 that 
includes odd lot transactions.  Second, we determine the relation between odd lot order 
imbalances and lagged, contemporaneous, and future returns.  Finally, we document the 
relation between intraday order imbalances and intraday odd lot order imbalances and intraday 
returns. 
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The third essay examines the information contained in two subsets of odd lot 
transactions: those that were originally submitted as odd lot orders, which we define as pure 
odd lot transactions, and those that were submitted as a 100+ share order but subsequently 
executed as two trades with one of the trades being an odd lot trade, which we define as 
circumstantial odd lot transactions.  We determine the price contribution and weighted price 
contribution of both subsets of odd lot transactions to determine how much information each 
group contributes to the informedness of odd lot transactions.  We examine the volume, 
number of trades, and information content of odd lot transactions, both pure and 
circumstantial, around stock splits. 
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ESSAY 1: THE BEHAVIOR, CHARACTERISTICS, AND INFORMATION 
CONTENT OF ODD-LOT TRANSACTIONS, OVER TIME
 2 
  
1.1 Introduction 
This study investigates the role odd lot trades play in equity markets, as well as how this 
role has changed from 2005 to 2010.  This study builds on the findings of O’Hara, Yao, and Ye 
(2011), who examine the determinants and information content of odd lot trades.  We extend 
this analysis by examining odd lot transactions during three distinct time periods: 2005, 2007, 
and 2010.  In each of these time periods, we document the price contribution of odd lot trades, 
the determinants of the proportion of odd lots transactions, and the characteristics of odd lot 
trading on an intraday basis and by day-of-the-week.  O’Hara, Yao, and Ye look at some of these 
issues in 2008 and 2009 for a sample of 120 NASDAQ stocks.  We use a larger set of equity 
securities and three time periods to determine if the role of odd lots has changed over time. 
 In our study, we define odd lots as trades of less than 100 shares (including those that 
are a partial execution of 100+ share orders).  We do not currently differentiate between odd 
lot trades that are submitted as odd lot orders and odd lot trades that are submitted as part of 
a 100+ share order, but executed in more than one trade with one of the trades being for less 
than 100 shares (for example, a 250 share order that is executed as two orders: one for 200 
shares and one for 50 shares).  There is limited research on odd lot transactions as trades of less 
than 100 shares are not reported in the NYSE Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database.  Trades of 
more than 100 shares, but not in 100 share increments (for 125 shares, for example), are 
included in TAQ. 
Although odd lot transactions can be submitted by either institutional or individual 
traders, a number of previous studies assume odd lot trades are individuals’ transactions.  
Ritter (1988) and Dyl and Maberly (1992) use odd lots trades as a proxy for individuals’ trades in 
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studies that investigate the Turn-of-the-Year Effect.  Similarly, Lakonishok and Maberly (1990) 
use odd lot trades as a proxy for individuals’ trades in their study on the Weekend Effect. 
In contrast, recent studies suggest that odd lot transactions are not only individuals’ 
trades.  O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2011) find that roughly one quarter of all trades initiated by high 
frequency traders (HFTs), who are not individual traders, are for less than 100 shares.  Their 
study uses a database of 120 stocks that contain odd lot transactions.  They investigate how 
odd lot transactions, which are missing from the TAQ database, affect market microstructure 
studies.   
Odd lot transactions are approximately 20% of the average stock’s transactions, 
accounting for approximately 7% of volume, and these trades are informative (O’Hara, Yao, and 
Ye, 2011).  We believe it is non-trivial that seven percent of volume and twenty percent of 
trades are omitted from previous studies that use the TAQ database.  To substantiate our 
belief, we use a robust sample of all stock trades executed on NASDAQ and confirm the O’Hara, 
Yao, and Ye results for a broader sample of stocks over multiple time periods. 
  
1.2 Hypothesis Development 
Many stock characteristics have changed over the past couple of decades.  We examine 
three of these characteristics that are shown to be determinants of odd lot proportions 
(O’Hara, Yao, and Ye, 2011): stock price, volatility, and spreads. 
 Volatility changes through time.  Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) find that 
individual stock volatility increases over the period 1962 to 1997, especially in relation to 
overall market volatility.  Schwert (2011) finds that overall market volatility fluctuates 
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dramatically over time, with the standard deviation of returns ranging from low single digits to 
roughly 60% since the inception of the U.S. stock markets.  During our time period (2005, 2007, 
and 2010), standard deviation of returns fluctuates from roughly 8% to 22%. 
 Spreads have decreased over the last two decades (Barclay, Christie, Harris, Kandel, and 
Schultz, 1999; Goldstein and Kavajecz, 2000; Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2001; 
Bessembinder, 2003; Battalio, Hatch, and Jennings, 2004; DeFontnouvelle, Fish, and Harris, 
2003; Boehmer and Boehmer, 2003; and Zhao and Chung, 2007).  Spreads are a determinant of 
odd lot proportions (O’Hara, Yao, and Ye, 2011).  Since spreads are declining over time, we 
determine if the relation between spreads and odd lot proportions changes over time. 
 Market participants have also changed over time.  A dramatic increase in the use of 
computerized, algorithmic, and high frequency trading (HFT) is purported by Brogaard (2010) 
who reports that HFTs are involved in 74% of all trades and O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2011) report 
HFTs are involved in 20-25% of odd lot transactions.   
 Changing determinants of odd lot proportions (volatility and spreads), changing market 
participants (the rise of HFTs), and the increase in the proportion of odd lot trading over time, 
lead us to hypothesize that the relation between odd lot proportions and their determinants 
have changed as well. 
Hypothesis 1 
Ho: The sensitivity of odd lot proportions to volatility and spreads changes over time. 
 
Studies show that the informational role of transactions is shifting to smaller trade sizes. 
Barclay and Warner (1993) find that medium sized trades (trades sizes between 500 and 9,999 
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shares) account for 83% of the cumulative price change of equities, while accounting for only 
38% of the trades for the time period 1981-1984.  They also find small trades (100 to 499 
shares) contribute only 2% to price formation while accounting for 60% of all trades.  However, 
Chakravarty (2001) finds that medium sized trades account for 78% of price contribution but 
only 57% of all trades in his sample from 1990-1991.  Small trades from this time period 
contribute negatively to price formation, while accounting for 36% of all trades.  Choe and 
Hansch (2005), using a sample from 1993 to 2003, find that price formation dramatically shifts 
in 1997 when small stock trades account for roughly 75% of price contribution.   
To determine the price contribution of all trades, not just 100+ share trades, odd lot 
transactions must be included in the analysis.  The first study to look at the price contribution of 
odd lot transactions is O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2011), who find that 27-35% of weighted price 
contribution occurs in odd lot transactions.  They also find that the proportion of odd lot 
transactions increase over their sample from 14% at the beginning of 2008 to 22% in 2009.  In 
their study, O’Hara, Yao, and Ye find that roughly 65% of weighted price contribution comes 
from trades of 100 to 500 shares and only 4% from trades of 500 to 9,999 shares.   
The informational role of small and medium sized trades differs between earlier studies.  
We interpret the results from these previous studies as implying that the information contained 
in trades is moving into smaller and smaller trade sizes over time.  Therefore, we expect to see 
that the price contribution of odd lot transactions is increasing over time. 
Hypothesis 2 
H0: The price contribution of odd lot transactions is increasing over time. 
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Many stock characteristics exhibit intraday patterns.  Wood, McInish, and Ord (1985) 
and Chan, Christie, and Schultz (1995) find that volatility has a U-shaped intraday pattern.  
Pagano, Peng, and Schwartz (2008) find that the institution of the opening and closing crosses 
on NASDAQ dampens the volatility at the open and close.  However, their findings conclude 
that the U-shaped pattern remains.  Jain and Joh (1988) and Foster and Viswanathan (1993) 
document a U-shaped pattern for volume.  Garvey and Wu (2009) document a U-shaped 
intraday pattern of spreads.  Since volatility and spreads are determinants of odd lot 
proportions (O’Hara, Yao, and Ye, 2011), we predict that odd lot proportions will also have a 
similar U-shaped intraday pattern. 
The intraday pattern of informed trades can also be used to predict the intraday pattern 
of odd lot transactions.  One of Garvey and Wu’s (2009) conclusions is that informed traders are 
trading more at the beginning and end of the day and less in the middle of the day.  Similarly, 
Foster and Viswanathan (1993) find that adverse selection costs are also U-shaped intraday, 
suggesting informed traders are participating at the beginning and end of the day.  We know 
that odd lot traders contribute to price formation to an extent that is greater than their 
proportion of volume (O’Hara, Yao, and Ye, 2011).  Based on the assumption that odd lot 
traders are informed, as they tend to be price-setters as opposed to price-takers, we predict 
that odd lot traders are also participating more at the beginning and end of the day, thereby 
dictating a U-shaped pattern to odd lot transactions. 
Hypothesis 3 
H0: The intraday pattern of odd lot proportions follows a U-shaped pattern. 
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Many stock characteristics display a day-of-the-week pattern.  Kiymaz and Berument 
(2003) document day-of-the-week patterns in several market metrics across several exchanges.  
For the United States, they report that volume is highest on Tuesdays, with Mondays and 
Fridays having the lowest volume. 
A volatility day-of-the-week effect is documented on most exchanges (Balanam, Bayear, 
and Kahn, 2001, and Alagidede, 2008).  However, the days of the week that exhibit higher 
volatility vary across countries.  Kiumaz and Berument (2001) document a volatility day-of-the-
week effect in the U.S. with Wednesdays and Fridays having the highest volatility.  O’Hara, Yao, 
and Ye (2011) show that odd lot proportions are driven by volatility.  Hence, we predict that 
odd lot proportions will follow a day-of-the-week pattern, with proportions being the highest 
on Wednesdays and Fridays. 
Hypothesis 4 
H0: A day-of-the-week pattern exists in odd lot proportions, with highest proportions being on 
Wednesdays and Fridays. 
 
1.3 Data and Methods 
Our sample consists of all trades in the NASDAQ Historical TotalView ITCH (ITCH) 
database from July 1 to December 31 for the years 2010, 2007, and 2005.  The ITCH database 
includes all trades that execute on NASDAQ.  We filter our sample to include only stocks that 
trade at least five times a day and at least 1,000 shares every day for the respective six month 
period (i.e. a stock will be included in the 2010 sample if it trades at least 5 times a day and at 
least 1000 shares every day during from July through December 2010, but might not be 
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included in the 2005 and 2007 sample, should it not meet the volume criteria for those six 
month periods).  Each stock is also classified as being listed on either the NYSE or NASDAQ 
exchange.  For our analysis, we only use trades that execute during market hours.  Trades 
executing for under 100 shares are denoted as odd lot trades. 
We compare our 2010 ITCH sample, which includes odd lot transactions, to trades in the 
NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ) database from July to December, 2010.  We apply the same filters 
to the TAQ data that we apply to the ITCH sample.  We use data from the Center for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP) to calculate daily stock returns, closing prices, daily high and low 
prices, closing bid and asks, and market capitalizations for July through December, 2010, 2007, 
and 2005. 
We follow O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2011) methods for the first several parts of our analysis.  
We first compare our ITCH sample to the corresponding TAQ sample to confirm their findings 
that odd lot transactions exclusively are omitted from the TAQ database.  
We also follow O’Hara, Yao and Ye (2011) methods in regressing odd lot proportions on 
price, spread, and volatility, using fixed effects and random effects regressions.  We use the 
Barclay and Warner (1993) method of calculating price contribution and weighted price 
contribution for seven transaction size classes: less than 100 shares, 100-500 shares, 501-900 
shares, 901-1900 shares, 1901-4900 shares, 4901-9999 shares, and over 10,000 shares.  We 
then compare the price contribution of each trade size class to its proportion of volume, both 
univariately and multivariately, to determine the informativeness of odd lot transactions.   
Finally, we plot the intraday and intraweek trading activity of odd lot volume and 
proportions to determine if odd lot transactions display an intraday and/or day-of-the-week 
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pattern.  We perform our analysis on each of our three time periods to determine if and how 
the characteristics of odd lot transactions have changed over time. 
 
1.4 Results 
Average Stock Day Odd Lot Transactions 
The number of stocks that trade at least five times and at least 1,000 shares per day on 
the NASDAQ exchange, on every day of our sample period of July through December for 2010, 
2007, and 2005 are listed in Table 1.  Table 1 also lists the number of days and the number of 
stock days that are in each sample.  We show these statistics for all stocks and by listing venue.  
The year 2007 has the most stocks executing at least five trades and at least 1,000 shares per 
day for all stocks and for each exchange.  Our data appears consistent with the Battalio, 
Egginton, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2011) finding that NASDAQ has seen a decrease in order 
flow market share in recent years. 
Table 2 shows our preliminary evidence that the characteristics of odd lot transactions 
vary over time and by exchange.  Table 2 lists average total volume, odd lot volume, number of 
trades, number of odd lot trades, and odd lot proportions for our sample by exchange with 
2010 averages in Panel A, 2007 averages in Panel B, and 2005 averages in Panel C.  Odd lot 
proportions are defined as the percentage of all volume and trades that occur as odd lot 
transactions.  Table 2 reports the largest average volume and largest odd lot volume occurs in 
2007, which is consistent with NASDAQ losing market share in recent years (Battalio, Egginton, 
Van Ness, and Van Ness, 2011).  Panel A reports that, in 2010, odd lot transactions account for 
roughly 8% of volume and roughly 20-22% of all trades.  These percentages are consistent with 
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the O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2011) findings of similar proportions in their sample of trades from 
2008 to 2009.   
Although absolute volume varies by exchange listing, odd lot proportions of volume are 
relatively the same for NASDAQ and NYSE-listed stocks in 2010, as well as in 2005, as reported 
by Panel C.  However, there is a larger proportion of odd lot trades in NYSE stocks as opposed 
to NASDAQ stocks in 2005 (25.8% compared to 16.0%).  Panel B shows that odd lot proportions 
are larger on NASDAQ (6.9% by volume and 19.4% by trades) than they are on NYSE (4.5% and 
14.0%).  Odd lot volume makes up roughly 6% of all volume in 2005 and 2007 and jumps to 
roughly 8% by 2010. 
Table 3 lists the results of standard t-tests of total volume and trades, odd lot volume 
and trades, and odd lot proportions of volume and trades between the years 2010 and 2007, 
2007 and 2005, and 2010 and 2005, with all stocks reported in Panel A, NASDAQ-listed stocks in 
Panel B, and NYSE-listed stocks in Panel C.  Most of the volume and trade metrics vary 
significantly between each of our time periods.  Regardless of listing venue, 2007 has the 
largest total volume and number of trades, confirming the Battalio, Egginton, Van Ness, and 
Van Ness (2011) finding that NASDAQ has lost market share of order flow since 2007.  Odd lot 
proportions are also varying over time.  We confirm that the odd lot proportion of volume 
increases over time by reporting a positive difference between 2010 and 2005 in both listing 
venues.  Odd lot proportion of trades also increases between 2005 and 2010 for all stocks and 
NASDAQ-listed stocks, but decreases for NYSE stocks.  Odd lot proportions increasing from 2005 
to 2010 is also consistent with O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2011), who find that odd lot proportions 
are increasing over the two years of their sample. 
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Odd Lot Transactions and TAQ 
O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2011) determine that odd lot transactions are omitted from the 
TAQ database for their sample years of 2008 and 2009.  We compare the trades in the ITCH 
database in 2010 to the corresponding trades in the TAQ database to determine if the O’Hara, 
Yao, and Ye findings hold for 2010 as well, and the results are listed in Table 4. 
After omitting odd lot transactions from the stock days in our ITCH data, we compare 
the transactions reported by ITCH to the corresponding stock days in TAQ.  We find that 
342,524 out of 423,689 stock days match exactly, meaning that the volume and number of 
trades reported by TAQ exactly matches the volume and number of shares reported by ITCH, 
excluding odd lot transactions.  The average difference between TAQ and ITCH is 153.10 shares 
and 0.44 trades, representing non-matching proportions 0.40% and 0.30%, respectively. 
Although economically insignificant, these differences are statistically significant, so we further 
investigate the data to determine the source of the discrepancies. 
We find time stamping issues in the datasets.  We consider trades that occur during 
market hours for our analysis and some trades are marked seconds or nanoseconds before the 
open in one dataset while they are marked seconds or nanoseconds into the trading day in the 
other dataset.  A similar issue occurs at the close.  As we find that one half of one percent does 
not completely match in the two datasets, again excluding odd lot transactions, and we have 
identified the source leading to the small discrepancy, we are confident in confirming the 
O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2011) finding that odd lot trades and odd lot trades exclusively are 
omitted from the TAQ dataset. 
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Determinants of Odd Lot Proportions 
Since spreads and volatility change over time, we postulate that their relation to odd lot 
proportions changes over time, as well.  Decreasing spreads are documented by many studies 
(Barclay, Christie, Harris, Kandel, and Schultz, 1999; Goldstein and Kavajecz, 2000; Chordia, Roll, 
and Subrahmanyam, 2001; Bessembinder, 2003; Battalio, Hatch, and Jennings, 2004; 
DeFontnouvelle, Fish, and Harris, 2003; Boehmer and Boehmer, 2003; and Zhao and Chung, 
2007).  Volatility changes are also documented (Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu, 2001; and 
Schwert, 2011).  In our study, we use the closing bid-ask spread, obtained from CRSP as a 
percentage of closing stock price as our measure of spread.  We use range, which is the dollar 
difference between the daily high and daily low price, as a proxy for volatility.  We also include 
price in our analysis as it is shown to be a determinant of odd lot proportions (O’Hara, Yao, and 
Ye, 2011).  We use fixed and random effects regressions to control for any stock specific 
characteristics that may influence odd lot proportions.  We also run our analysis with OLS and 
random effects regressions following the methods of O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2011), but do not 
report the results as these regressions only measure cross sectional variations in the variables 
and do not control for stock specific characteristics. 
We regress the proportion of odd lot volume and proportion of odd lot trades on stock 
price, spread, and range, using both fixed effects and random effects.  The results of the fixed 
effects regressions are listed in Table 5.  We only report the fixed effects because Haussman 
Tests between the coefficients of the fixed and random effects regressions reject that the two 
estimators are the same and the random effects coefficients are not consistent. The analysis is 
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divided into exchange listings and year with Panel A listing 2010 results, Panel B listing 2007 
results, and Panel C listing 2005 results. 
Consistent with O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2011), stock price is a positive predictor of both 
odd lot proportions of volume and odd lot proportions of trades.  Positive regression 
coefficients for price are consistent across listings exchanges, time periods, and estimation 
technique.   
O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2011) find spread to be a positive predictor of odd lot proportions, 
using a sample from 2008 to 2009.  We confirm these results with our 2010 sample.  The 
coefficients of our regressions for spreads are consistently positive.  The spread coefficients are 
also positive for all stocks and NASDAQ-listed stocks in our 2007 and 2005 samples.  However, 
the spread coefficients for NYSE-listed stocks in 2007 and 2005 are negative, suggesting that in 
2007 and 2005, odd lot proportions of volume and trades decreased as spreads increased.  The 
negative spread coefficients for NYSE-listed stocks in 2007 and 2005 is preliminary evidence 
supporting Hypothesis 1 that asserts the sensitivity of odd lot proportions to the determinants 
of odd lot proportions varies over time.  For NYSE stocks, the sensitivity to spreads switches 
signs over our sample time period. 
O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2011) find volatility, as proxied by range, to be a negative predictor 
of odd lot proportions.  We confirm these results with consistently negative coefficients for 
range across all time periods and listing venues. 
Hypothesis 1 asserts that the sensitivity of odd lot proportions to volatility and spreads 
changes over time.  We find strong evidence to support this hypothesis.  Table 6 reports the 
results of z-tests of the coefficients listed in Table 5 between 2010 and 2007, 2007 and 2005, 
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and 2010 and 2005.  Panel A of Table 6 lists the results of the z-tests for all stocks, Panel B lists 
the results for NASDAQ-listed stocks, and Panel C lists the results for NYSE-listed stocks.  We 
also empirically test whether the sensitivity of odd lot proportions to changes in price, which is 
shown to be a predictor of odd lot proportions, varies over time. 
Although we confirm that price is a consistently positive predictor of odd lot proportions 
in Table 5, Table 6 shows that the sensitivity of odd lot proportions of volume and trades to 
price varies across each of our time periods for all stocks, regardless of listing venue.  The 
sensitivity of odd lot proportions to spreads varies across our time periods for all listing venues 
as well, especially for NYSE-listed stocks, which confirms our finding in Table 5 of spread 
coefficients changing signs for NYSE stocks between 2005 and 2010.  The sensitivity of odd lot 
proportions to volatility, as proxied by range, varies across our time periods for all stocks and by 
listing venue.  The significant differences in the coefficients of the determinants of odd lot 
proportions between our time periods lends strong support to the changing sensitivity of odd 
lot proportions to their determinants over time, thereby supporting Hypothesis 1. 
 
Price Contribution of Odd Lot Transactions 
To test Hypothesis 2 that the price contribution of odd lot transactions is changing over 
time, we use the Barclay and Warner (1993) calculation of price contribution and weighted 
price contribution.  These calculations measure the proportion of the daily price change of a 
stock that can be attributed to trades occurring in particular size classes.  Consistent with 
previous literature (Barclay and Warner, 1993; Chakravarty, 2001; and O’Hara, Yao, and Ye, 
2011), we define our trade size classes to be: less than 100 shares, 100-500 shares, 501-900 
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shares, 901-1900 shares, 1901-4900 shares, 4901-9999 shares, and greater than 10,000 shares.  
The Barclay and Warner (1993) calculation of price contribution (PC) and weighted price 
contribution (WPC) is as follows. 
The return on each trade i is calculated as the execution price of the trade less the 
execution price of the previous trade for that stock.  Each trade is categorized into size class j 
according to the definitions above.  The price contribution, PC, of size class j for stock s on day t 
is then calculated as the ratio of the sum the returns on trades i in class j for stock s on day t to 
the sum of the returns for all trades i for stock s on day t.   
𝑃𝐶𝑗
𝑠,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑟𝑖,𝑗𝑠,𝑡𝑛𝑖=1
∑ 𝑟𝑖
𝑠,𝑡𝑛
𝑖=1
 
The weight, W, for stock s on day t is calculated as the ratio of sum of the returns of all trades i 
in stock s on day t to the sum of all trades i in all stocks on day t.   
𝑊𝑠
𝑡 = ∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑠,𝑡𝑛𝑖=1
∑ ∑ 𝑟𝑛𝑖=1 𝑖
𝑠,𝑡𝑛
𝑠=1
 
The weighted price contribution, WPC, for size class j on day t is calculated as the sum of the 
products of the weight for stock s on day t and the PC of size class j for stock s on day t for all 
stocks.   
𝑊𝑃𝐶𝑗
𝑡 =�(𝑛
𝑠=1
𝑊𝑠
𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝐶𝑗
𝑠,𝑡) 
The weighted price contribution WPC for size class j is calculated as the mean of all weighted 
price contributions for size class j on all days t. 
𝑊𝑃𝐶𝑗 = ∑ 𝑊𝑃𝐶𝑗𝑡𝑛𝑡=1 𝑡  
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Table 7 reports the weighted price contributions for all seven size classes by listing 
venue and year.  Our positive price contribution for the odd lot transaction size class of < 100 
shares confirm the O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2011) finding that odd lot transactions contribute 
positively to price formation.  Odd lot transactions contribute more to price formation than all 
other classes with the exception of 100-500 shares.  Size class 100-500 shares show the largest 
weighted price contribution, which is consistent with Barclay and Warner (1993), Chakravarty 
(2001) and Alexander and Peterson (2007), who conclude informed traders break their large 
trades into 100 to 500 share transactions. 
Hypothesis 2 asserts that the weighted price contribution of odd lot transactions 
increases over time.  We test this hypothesis by testing the differences between the WPCs from 
2010 and 2007, 2007 and 2005, and 2010 and 2005, for the seven trade size classes using 
standard t-tests.  We report the results of the tests in Table 8, with the results for all stocks 
listed in Panel A, NASDAQ-listed stocks in Panel B, and NYSE-listed stocks in Panel C.  The WPC 
for odd lot transactions in all stocks increases from 2007 to 2010, 2005 to 2007, and from 2005 
to 2010.  For NASDAQ-listed stocks, WPC increases from 2005 to 2007 and from 2005 to 2010, 
and does not decrease from 2007 to 2010.  For NYSE-listed stocks, WPC decreases from 2005 to 
2007, but increases from 2007 to 2010 and from 2005 to 2010.  WPCs for odd lot transactions 
generally increasing over our sample lend strong support to WPCs for odd lot transactions 
increasing over time, supporting Hypothesis 2. 
We further investigate the price contribution of the seven trade size classes by 
comparing price contribution to proportion of volume.  The difference between PC and 
proportion of volume of a particular class indicates the amount by which a particular size class 
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contributes to price formation above what is expected given its proportion of volume.  Table 9 
reports the results of the comparison with the 2010 comparison in Panel A, 2007 comparison in 
Panel B, and 2005 comparison in Panel C.  If the informativeness of odd lot transactions is 
increasing over time, we expect the difference between PC and proportion of volume to be 
increasing over time.  However, the difference between PC and proportion of volume is not 
increasing over time.  For all stocks and for NASDAQ-listed stocks, the difference increases from 
2005 to 2007, but decreases from 2007 to 2010.  For NYSE-listed stocks, the difference 
decreases from 2005 to 2007 and decreases again from 2007 to 2010.  Since the difference 
between PC and proportion of volume is not increasing over time, we suggest that the 
information contained in odd lot transactions is not increasing over time, which does not 
support Hypothesis 2 and is in contrast to the findings in Table 8.  We further investigate the 
contradictory findings in a multivariate framework. 
It is interesting to note that the difference between odd lot transaction price 
contribution and odd lot proportion of volume is greater than the difference between the PC of 
trades of 100-500 shares and its respective proportion of volume.  Using this measure of 
informedness, the results suggest that odd lot transactions contain more information than 
trades in the 100-500 share size class. 
We now test, in a multivariate framework, if odd lot transactions are contributing more 
to price formation than their proportion of volume dictates.  Following the method of O’Hara, 
Yao, and Ye (2011), we use a weighted least squares regression of the price contribution of 
trade size classes on a dummy that equals one if the size class is less than 100 shares and zero 
otherwise; a dummy variable that equals one if the size class is greater than or equal to 100 
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shares and zero otherwise; and the size class proportion of volume and trades.  The 
observations are weighted for the WLS regression by the weight calculated in the WPC models: 
the ratio of the return on stock s on day t to the return of the market on day t.  We avoid 
perfect colinearity issues by suppressing the intercept in the WLS regression.  If odd lot 
transactions contribute to price formation above their proportion of volume, we expect a 
significantly positive coefficient for the < 100 shares dummy variable. 
Table 10 reports the results of the weighted least squares regressions and we include 
the proportion of volume in the regressions reported in columns one, three, and five, and the 
proportion of trades in the regressions reported in columns two, four, and six.  Results are 
reported by listing venue and by year.  The coefficients for the odd lot transactions dummy 
variable are consistently positive, except for NYSE-listed stocks when including proportion of 
trades in 2010 and 2005.  The positive coefficient for the odd lot transaction dummy variable 
suggests that odd lot transactions contribute to price formation above what is dictated by odd 
lot proportion of volume and trades.  This finding is consistent with O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2011). 
However, we find evidence that does not support Hypothesis 2 in the results listed in 
Table 10.  We hypothesized that the information contained in odd lot transactions increases 
over time.  If information is increasing over time, the coefficients of the < 100 shares dummy 
variables will increase in magnitude from 2005 to 2010, which is not the case.  For all stocks and 
for NASDAQ stocks, the odd lot transaction dummy coefficient increases from 2005 to 2007 but 
decreases from 2007 to 2010, which is true regardless of the inclusion of odd lot proportions of 
volume or trades in the regression.  NYSE-listed stocks do not show a pattern of increasing <100 
shares coefficients either, with the coefficients decreasing in one period or the other. 
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It is interesting to note that transactions of 100 shares or more have a negative 
coefficient while the coefficient for transactions of less than 100 shares are largely positive in all 
of the regressions that include proportion of volume and a large portion of the regressions that 
include proportion of trades, suggesting that trades of 100 shares or more contribute less to 
price formation than their proportion of volume predicates.  Using this definition of 
informedness, odd lot transactions contain more information than transactions of more than 
100 shares. 
We attempt to definitively determine if the information contained in odd lot 
transactions is increasing or decreasing over time with the regression results reported in Table 
11.  To obtain the results, we run weighted least squares regression on three subsets of our 
data, with each subset containing two years of observations: 2010 and 2007, 2007 and 2005, 
and 2010 and 2005.  Price contribution of trades size classes is the dependent variable, and the 
independent variables are year dummies, a dummy variable equal to one if the trade size class 
is odd lot trades, interaction terms between the odd lot transactions dummy variable and the 
year dummies, the trade size class proportion of volume in columns one, three, and five, and 
the trade size class proportion of trades in columns two, four, and six.  The observations are 
weighted for the WLS regression by the weight from the WPC calculation as described earlier.  
Panel A lists the regression results for all stocks, Panel B lists the results for NASDAQ-listed 
stocks, and Panel C lists the results for NYSE-listed stocks. We expect to see positive coefficients 
for the interaction terms in each of the regressions if the information contained in odd lot 
transactions is increasing over time. 
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The interaction terms denoting odd lot transactions in the later year of the subset are 
not consistently positive.  The price contribution of odd lot transactions is decreasing between 
2007 and 2010 for all stocks and NASDAQ-listed stocks, but increasing between 2005 and 2007 
and between 2005 and 2010 for all stocks and NASDAQ-listed stocks.  The results for NYSE-
listed stocks are also mixed with positive coefficients for some of the regressions and negative 
for others, depending on the model specification and time period.  With half of the coefficients 
for the interactions terms being negative, we conclude that the price contribution of odd lot 
transactions does not increase over time, which does not support Hypothesis 2. 
We believe odd lot transaction informedness not to be increasing over time to be an 
important conclusion.  Odd lot transactions contain information at least as far back as 2005.  
Most microstructure studies omit odd lot transactions.  Omitting odd lot transactions omits the 
information contained therein, and therefore, may bias the results of previous studies. 
 
Intraday Patterns of Odd Lot Transactions 
Figure 1 plots the average total volume and number of trades on the NASDAQ exchange 
by minute of the trading day for our three time periods.  Panel A includes all transactions.  
Panel B includes odd lot transactions only.  Panel C plots the proportion of odd lot volume and 
trades relative to all volume and trades.  Table 12 reports the results of regressing total volume, 
total number of trades, odd lot volume, odd lot trades, and the proportion of odd lot volume 
and trades on 26 30-minute intervals with interval 13 omitted.  Panel A reports 2010 regression 
results, Panel B reports 2007 results, and Panel C reports 2005 results. 
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Figure 1, Panel A shows the expected U-shaped pattern for volume and number of 
trades in all years of our sample.  Table 12 supports the U-shape with larger coefficients 
reported at the beginning and ending of the day, with the middle of the day showing 
insignificant coefficients.  The U-shaped pattern supports Jain and Joh (1988) and Foster and 
Viswanathan (1993), who also find a U-shaped pattern to volume.  Panel B shows that odd lot 
volume and odd lot number of trades follow a U-shaped pattern similar to total volume and 
total number of trades.  The U-shaped pattern is also supported with the regression results in 
Table 12. 
Hypothesis 3 asserts a U-shaped pattern of odd lot proportions of volume and number 
of trades.  The figures in Panel C suggest that there is not a U-shaped pattern of odd lot 
proportions.  There is a spike in volume and number of trades at the end of the day in all three 
time periods, which is similar to the end of the day spikes seen in Panels A and B.  However, 
2010 odd lot proportion of volume starts out lower at the beginning of the trading day and 
seems to follow a slight reverse U-shape during the middle of the day, until the spike in the last 
30 minutes.  The 2010 odd lot proportion of trades appears fairly constant in the middle of the 
day until the spike in the last 30 minutes.  There is little evidence in Figure 1 to support 
Hypothesis 3 that odd lot proportions follow a U-shaped intraday pattern in 2010, except for 
the sharp upturn in proportions at the very end of the trading day. 
The fifth and sixth columns of Table 12 also fail to support Hypothesis 3.  In 2010, the 
coefficients for the periods in the beginning and end of the day tend to be negative, except for 
the spike at the end of the day that starts in period 26.  In 2007, Table 12 shows only slight 
evidence of a U-shape at the beginning of the day with positive coefficients in periods 1 and 2 
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and at the end of the day for the regression using odd lot proportion of volume.  However, 
since periods 3 and 4 have negative coefficients in the regression using odd lot proportion of 
volume, we conclude that there is not a U-shaped pattern to odd lot proportions in 2007.  Panel 
C of Table 12 also has negative coefficients for periods during the early part of the trading day, 
lending evidence that a U-shaped pattern to odd lot proportions does not exist in 2005, either. 
 
Intraweek Patterns of Odd Lot Proportions 
Figure 2 graphs volume and number of trades over the days-of-the-week for all three of 
our sample time periods.  Panel A graphs total volume and number of trades, Panel B graphs 
odd lot volume and number of trades, and Panel C graphs odd lot proportions of volume and 
trades.  As in Table 1, volume and number of trades is highest in 2007, which is consistent with 
a decrease in market share for NASDAQ (Battalio, Egginton, Van Ness, and Van Ness, 2011).  
Odd lot volume and number of shares are also highest in 2007. 
The patterns seem to be somewhat consistent with Kiymaz and Berument (2003), who 
show Monday and Friday have the lowest volume and Tuesday has the highest volume.  In 
Figure 2, Panel A, Monday and Friday have the lowest volume but Thursday has the highest 
volume in 2005 and 2007.  Tuesday shows a slightly higher volume in 2010, which is consistent 
with Kiymaz and Berument (2003).  The odd lot transaction patterns in Panel B are similar to 
the total volume and number of trades pattern in Panel A, with Monday and Friday having the 
lowest numbers. 
We further investigate the day-of-the-week patterns using regression results reported in 
Table 13.  We regress the total volume, total number of trades, odd lot volume, number of odd 
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lot trades, odd lot proportion of volume, and odd lot proportion on day of the week dummies 
excluding Wednesday, using stock day observations.  Panel A reports the regression results for 
2010, Panel B reports the results for 2007, and Panel C reports the results for 2005.  In 2010, 
the coefficients for Monday and Friday are the most negative in the regressions using total 
volume, suggesting these days have the lowest volume, and Tuesday has the largest coefficient, 
suggesting Tuesday has the highest volume.  The regression results are consistent with Kiymaz 
and Berument (2003).  The results in Panel B and Panel C show that Monday and Friday have 
the lowest volume in 2007 and 2005, as well.  Table 13 shows that odd lot volume follows a 
similar pattern to total volume in all three time frames, with lowest odd lot volume tending to 
be on Mondays and Fridays. 
Hypothesis 4 asserts that a day-of-the-week pattern exists for odd lot proportions of 
volume and trades, with the highest proportions registering on Wednesday and Friday.  Panel C 
of Figure 1 contradicts this hypothesis.  There is a slight U-shaped pattern to odd lot 
proportions of volume and trades in 2010, 2007, and 2005, which is different than our 
prediction of Wednesdays and Fridays having the largest proportions.  The exception to the 
slight U-shaped pattern is odd lot proportion of trades in 2005, which has a slight reverse U-
shape. 
Table 13 also contradicts Hypothesis 4.  In 2010, Monday shows the highest proportion 
of odd lot volume and trades.  In 2007, all days-of-the-week have a larger odd lot proportion of 
volume and trades relative to Wednesday.  In 2005, Fridays have the lowest odd lot proportion 
of volume and trades. 
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We also investigate if the intraweek patterns of odd lot proportions change over time.  
Figure 2, Panel C shows evidence that 2010, 2007, and 2005 all display a slight U-shaped 
pattern, as do the odd lot proportions of trades in 2010 and 2007.  2005 proportions of odd lot 
trades display a slight reverse U-shaped pattern, which suggests that the intraweek pattern for 
odd lot proportions of trades from 2005 to 2007 is the only instance where there is a change to 
patterns over time. 
The regression results in Table 13, however, suggest that odd lot patterns change over 
time.  In 2005, the Friday dummy coefficient is lower in the odd lot proportion of volume 
regression and the rest of the week is not significantly different from Wednesday.  In 2007, all 
days have a higher odd lot proportion of volume relative to Wednesday, and in 2010 only 
Monday has a higher odd lot proportion of volume.  Similar discrepancies between the years 
can be identified in the regressions using odd lot proportion of trades.  In 2007, all days have a 
higher proportion of odd lot trades, whereas all days but Tuesday have lower odd lot 
proportions of trades in 2005, and there seems to be a slight U-shaped pattern in 2010, with 
Mondays and Fridays having the largest proportion of odd lot trades. 
 
1.5 Conclusions 
We examine several characteristics of odd lot transactions and how they change over 
time.  Using a sample containing all trades that execute on NASDAQ from July to December, 
2010, 2007, and 2005, we find that odd lot transactions make up roughly 8% of all volume and 
20-22% of all trades.  Odd lot proportions increase from 2007 and 2005 to 2010.   We also find 
that odd lot transactions and odd lot transactions exclusively are omitted from the TAQ 
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database.  These findings are consistent with O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2011).  We also find that odd 
lot proportions vary by listing venue. 
We find that the determinants of odd lot proportions drastically change subsequent to 
2005 and across listing venues.  Price, which is a positive predictor of odd lot proportions in the 
vast majority of regressions, is a negative predictor for NYSE stocks in 2007 and 2005.  Spread, 
which is a positive predictor of odd lot proportions in 2010, is a negative predictor in 2007 and 
2005.  Volatility, which is a negative predictor or odd lot proportions in 2010, is a positive 
predictor in 2007 and 2005.  
The weighted price contribution of odd lot transactions is positive for all three of our 
time periods, with no discernible patterns of odd lot WPC increasing or decreasing over time.  
The price contribution of odd lot transactions is above their proportion of volume, leading us to 
conclude that odd lot transactions contain information and have since at least 2005.  Therefore, 
odd lot trades must be included in studies on capital markets and asset pricing in instances 
where the results could be biased by their exclusion. 
Intraday patterns in odd lot proportion exist and have not been static over time.   There 
is a slight reverse U-shape during the trading day with a large spike in odd lot proportions in the 
last thirty minutes of trading.  Intraweek patterns in odd lot proportions also exist, but remain 
fairly constant over time.  There is a very slight U-shaped pattern with the highest proportions 
being on Mondays and Fridays. 
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Table 1. Number of Days, Stocks, and Stock Days by Exchange and by Year 
  All  NASDAQ  NYSE 
Variable  2010 2007 2005  2010 2007 2005  2010 2007 2005 
No. Days 
No. Stocks 
No. Stock Days 
 128 
3,319 
424,832 
127 
3,826 
485,902 
127 
1,999 
253,873 
 128 
1,421 
181,888 
127 
1,901 
241,427 
127 
1,401 
177,927 
 128 
1,898 
242,944 
127 
1,925 
244,475 
127 
598 
75,946 
Table 1 lists the number of days, the number stocks that trade at least 5 times and at least 1,000 shares on NASDAQ every day of the 
six months July through December, and the number of stock days of at least 5 trades and 1,000 shares on NASDAQ during the six 
months July to December for 2010, 2007, and 2005, for all socks, stocks listed on the NASDAQ, and stocks listed on the NYSE. 
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Table 2.  Summary Statistics: Average Stock Days 
Panel A: 2010 means 
Variable  All Stocks  NASDAQ  NYSE 
Volume 
          Total 
 
 
          Odd 
 
No. Trades 
          Total 
          
           
          Odd 
 
% Odd 
          Volume 
 
  
         No. Trades 
 
  
361,296.20 
(1,676,922.19) 
 
13,920.40 
(29,838.22) 
 
1970.44 
(4,996.49) 
 
326.88 
(697.31) 
 
0.0810 
(0.0614) 
 
0.2177 
(0.1244) 
  
320,440.57 
(1,248,206.94) 
 
13,690.37 
(33,756.34) 
 
1,819.67 
(4,379.43) 
 
333.67 
(817.65) 
 
0.0815 
(0.0598) 
 
0.2289 
(0.1282) 
  
413,163.72 
(1,979,468.50) 
 
14,877.96 
(27,313.63) 
 
2,198.52 
(5,529.95) 
 
339.97 
(610.82) 
 
0.0788 
(0.0592) 
 
0.2044 
(0.1140) 
  N=424,832  N=181,888  N=242,944 
 
Panel B: 2007 Means 
Variable  All Stocks  NASDAQ  NYSE 
Volume 
          Total 
 
 
          Odd 
 
No. Trades 
          Total 
          
           
          Odd 
 
% Odd 
          Volume 
 
  
         No. Trades 
  
464,733.30 
(2,441,960.67) 
 
13,968.77 
(34,377.56) 
 
2,299.69 
(6,391.75) 
 
328.75 
(793.61) 
 
0.0572 
(0.0518) 
 
0.1675 
(0.1183) 
  
462,597.74 
(2,397,673.58) 
 
15,925.58 
(40,065.03) 
 
2,227.56 
(5,961.15) 
 
360.61 
(895.68) 
 
0.0693 
(0.0576) 
 
0.1941 
(0.1231) 
  
466,918.29 
(2,486,459.62) 
 
11,959.04 
(27,184.68) 
 
2,373.48 
(6,803.38) 
 
296.03 
(671.27) 
 
0.0447 
(0.0414) 
 
0.1402 
(0.1064) 
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  N=485,902  N=241,427  N=244,475 
 
Panel C: 2005 Means 
Variable  All Stocks  NASDAQ  NYSE 
Volume 
          Total 
 
 
          Odd 
 
No. Trades 
          Total 
          
           
          Odd 
 
% Odd 
          Volume 
 
  
         No. Trades 
 
  
244,878.90 
(1,350,783.05) 
 
5,233.51 
(12,191.12) 
 
941.09 
(2,836.69) 
 
143.44 
(337.47) 
 
0.0552 
(0.0592) 
 
0.1889 
(0.1641) 
  
277,665.15 
(1,501,459.18) 
 
5,768.96 
(13,659.37) 
 
1,041.63 
(2,987.16) 
 
137.15 
(362.07) 
 
0.0553 
(0.0510) 
 
0.1602 
(0.1077) 
  
168,004.21 
(899,178.15) 
 
3,941.10 
(7,392.63) 
 
705.36 
(2431.66) 
 
158.61 
(268.38) 
 
0.0548 
(0.0755) 
 
0.2582 
(0.2392) 
 
  N=253,873  N=177,927  N=75,946 
Table 2 lists the mean total volume, odd lot volume, total number of trades, number of odd lot 
trades, odd lot volume as a proportion of total volume, and the number of odd lot trades as a 
proportion of the total number of trades calculated from all trades executed on NASDAQ for all 
stocks, NASDAQ-listed stocks, and NYSE-listed stocks for July through December, 2010, 2007, 
and 2005.  Panel A lists averages for 2010.  Panel B lists averages for 2007.  Panel C lists 
averages for 2005.  N denotes the number of stock days used to calculate the averages for each 
category.  Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 3.  Differences in Means 
Panel A:  All Stocks 
Variable 2010-2007 2007-2005 2010-2005 
Volume    
          Total -103,437.10*** 219,854.40*** 116,417.30*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
    
          Odd -48.37 8,735.26*** 8,686.89*** 
 (0.472) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
No. Trades    
          Total -329.25*** 1,358.60*** 1,029.35*** 
          (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
              
          Odd -1.87 185.31*** 183.44*** 
 (0.244) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
% Odd    
          Volume 0.0238*** 0.0020*** 0.0258*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
     
         No. Trades 0.0502*** -0.0214*** 0.0288*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
     
 
Panel B: NASDAQ Listed Stocks 
Variable 2010-2007 2007-2005 2010-2005 
Volume    
          Total -142,157.17*** 184,932.59*** 42,775.42*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
    
          Odd -2,235.21*** 10,156.62*** 7,921.41*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
No. Trades    
          Total -407.89*** 1,185.93*** 778.04*** 
          (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
              
          Odd -26.94*** 223.46*** 196.52*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
% Odd    
          Volume 0.0122*** 0.0140*** 0.0262*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
     
         No. Trades 0.0348*** 0.0339*** 0.0687*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
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Panel C: NYSE Listed Stocks 
Variable 2010-2007 2007-2005 2010-2005 
Volume    
          Total -53,754.57*** 298,914.08*** 245,159.51*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
    
          Odd 2,918.92*** 8,017.94*** 10,936.86*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
No. Trades    
          Total -174.96*** 1,668.12*** 1,493.16*** 
          (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
              
          Odd 43.94*** 137.42*** 181.36*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
% Odd    
          Volume 0.0341*** -0.0101*** 0.0240*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
     
         No. Trades 0.0642*** -0.1180*** -0.0538*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
     
Table 3 lists the differences in mean total volume, odd lot volume, total trades, odd lot trades, 
odd lot proportion of volume, and odd lot proportion of trades between 2010 and 2007, 2007 
and 2005, and 2010 and 2005 from all trades executing on NASDAQ for July through December, 
2010, 2007, and 2005.  Panel A lists the differences in means for all stocks, Panel B lists the 
differences in means for NASDAQ-listed stocks, and Panel C lists the differences in means for 
NYSE-listed stocks.  P-values from standard t-tests testing the differences in the means are 
reported in parentheses. ***, ** & * denote significance at the 1%, 5% & 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 4.  Odd Lot Transactions in TAQ 
No. Days match Stock Days       Avg. Not Matched Mean (p-value) 
= 100% 
 
< 100% 
 
342,524 
 
81,165 
      Volume 
 
 
Trades 
 
 
% Volume 
 
 
% Trades 
153.10*** 
(<.0001) 
 
0.44*** 
(<.0001) 
 
0.004*** 
(<.0001) 
 
0.003*** 
(<.0001) 
 
         N=424,832 
Table 4 lists the number of stock days in the NYSE Trade and Quote database that have the 
exact same number of trades and shares trades as the corresponding stock day in the NASDAQ 
Historical TotalView ITCH database, less odd lot transactions, and the number of stock days that 
do not exactly match.  It lists the average difference in volume, number of trades, and 
proportions of volume and number of trades between the two databases.  N denotes the 
number of stock days used to calculate the averages for each category.  P-values are in 
reported in parentheses.  ***, ** & * denote significance at the 1%, 5% & 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 5.  Determinants of Odd Lot Proportions of Volume and Number of Trades 
Panel A: 2010 
  All Stocks  NASDAQ  NYSE 
Variable  % Odd Volume % Odd Trades  % Odd Volume % Odd Trades  % Odd Volume % Odd Trades 
Intercept  0.0726*** 0.2113***  0.0767*** 0.2256***  0.0669*** 0.1949*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 
Price ($) 
  
0.0006*** 
 
0.0007*** 
  
0.0005*** 
 
0.0007*** 
  
0.0006*** 0.0007*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 
Spread (%) 
  
0.1003*** 
 
0.4108*** 
  
0.0738** 
 
0.3923*** 
  
0.0399 0.4133** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.021) (<.0001)  (0.700) (0.046) 
 
Range ($) 
  
-0.0105*** 
 
-0.0187*** 
  
-0.0109*** 
 
-0.0201*** 
  
-0.0098*** -0.0172*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
R2  0.0176 0.0116  0.0169 0.0104  0.0208 0.0140 
 
Panel B: 2007 
  All Stocks  NASDAQ  NYSE 
Variable  % Odd Volume % Odd Trades  % Odd Volume % Odd Trades  % Odd Volume % Odd Trades 
Intercept  0.0463*** 0.1433***  0.0592*** 0.1745***  0.0332*** 0.1112*** 
  (<.0001) (0.001)  (<.0001) (0.001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 
Price ($) 
 
0.0005*** 0.0011*** 
 
0.0007*** 0.0014*** 
 
0.0004*** 0.0009*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 
Spread (%) 
 
0.0469*** 0.0617* 
 
0.1317*** 0.1971*** 
 
-0.0600*** -0.1116** 
  (0.015) (0.033)  (0.022) (0.047)  (0.019) (0.013) 
 
Range ($) 
 
-0.0040*** -0.0083*** 
 
-0.0072*** -0.0132*** 
 
-0.0023*** -0.0056*** 
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  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
R2  0.0117 0.0106  0.0176 0.0135  0.0095 0.0099 
 
Panel C: 2005 
  All Stocks  NASDAQ  NYSE 
Variable  % Odd Volume % Odd Trades  % Odd Volume % Odd Trades  % Odd Volume % Odd Trades 
Intercept  0.0383*** 0.1574***  0.0371*** 0.1242***  0.0420*** 0.2404*** 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (<.0001) 
 
Price ($) 
 
0.0008*** 0.0016*** 
 
0.0011*** 0.0022*** 
 
0.0004*** 0.0009*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 
Spread (%) 
 
0.1783*** 0.3041*** 
 
0.2862*** 0.5048*** 
 
-0.3219*** -0.6303** 
  (0.041) (0.091)  (0.041) (0.082)  (0.118) (0.037) 
 
Range ($) 
 
-0.0079*** -0.0195*** 
 
-0.0092*** -0.0189*** 
 
-0.0061*** -0.0201*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
R2  0.0130 0.0138  0.0192 0.0198  0.0068 0.0102 
Table 5 lists the results of fixed effect regressions with odd lot transactions as a proportion of volume and odd lot transactions 
as a proportion of all trades as the dependent variables on all NASDAQ trades that occurred from July through December, 2010, 
2007, and 2005, for all stocks, NASDAQ-listed stocks, and NYSE-listed stocks.  The independent variables are price, measured in 
dollars; closing bid ask spread, measured as a percentage of the midpoint; and range, measured as the dollar value difference 
between the daily high and daily low.  Panel A lists the results from 2010, Panel B lists the results from 2007, and Panel C lists 
the results from 2005.  P-values are in reported parentheses.   ***, ** & * denote significance at the 1%, 5% & 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 6. Differences in Estimation Coefficients of Determinants of Odd Lot Proportions 
Panel A: All Stocks 
  % Odd Volume  % Odd Trades 
Variable  2010-2007 2007-2005 2010-2005  2010-2007 2007-2005 2010-2005 
Price ($)  0.0001*** -0.0003*** -0.0002***  -0.0004*** -0.0006*** -0.0010*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 
Spread (%) 
 
0.0534* -0.1314*** -0.0780 
 
0.3492*** -0.2424** 0.1067 
  (0.081) (0.002) (0.109)  (<.0001) (0.012) (0.318) 
 
Range ($) 
 
-0.0064*** 0.0038*** -0.0026*** 
 
-0.0103*** 0.0111*** 0.0008* 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.072) 
         
 
Panel B: NASDAQ Listed Stocks 
  % Odd Volume  % Odd Trades 
Variable  2010-2007 2007-2005 2010-2005  2010-2007 2007-2005 2010-2005 
Price ($)  -0.0002*** -0.0004*** -0.0005***  -0.0007*** -0.0008*** -0.0015*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 
Spread (%) 
 
-0.0579 -0.1545*** -0.2124*** 
 
0.1951** -0.3076*** -0.1125 
  (0.135) (0.001) (<.0001)  (0.024) (0.001) (0.303) 
 
Range ($) 
 
-0.0037*** 0.0020*** -0.0017*** 
 
-0.0068*** 0.0057*** -0.0011* 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.074) 
         
 
Panel C: NYSE Listed Stocks 
  % Odd Volume  % Odd Trades 
Variable  2010-2007 2007-2005 2010-2005  2010-2007 2007-2005 2010-2005 
Price ($)  0.0002*** -0.0001** 0.0001***  -0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0002** 
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  (<.0001) (0.038) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.750) (0.031) 
 
Spread (%) 
 
0.0999 0.2619** 0.3618** 
 
0.5249** 0.5187* 1.0436*** 
  (0.343) (0.028) (0.021)  (0.013) (0.089) (0.004) 
 
Range ($) 
 
-0.0075*** 0.0038*** -0.0037*** 
 
-0.0116*** 0.0154*** 0.0038*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
         
Table 6 lists the differences in the coefficients from fixed effects regressions of proportion of odd lot volume and proportion of 
odd lot trades on price, measured in dollars; closing bid ask spread, measured as a percentage of the midpoint; and range, 
measured as the dollar value difference between the daily high and daily low between 2010 and 2007, 2007 and 2005, and 2010 
and 2005 for all NASDAQ trades that occurred from July through December, 2010, 2007, and 2005.  Panel A lists the differences 
in coefficients for all stocks, Panel B lists the differences in coefficients for NASDAQ-listed stocks, and Panel C lists the 
differences in coefficients for NYSE-listed stocks.  P-values from z-tests testing the differences in coefficients are reported in 
parentheses.  ***, ** & * denote significance at the 1%, 5% & 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 7.  Weighted Price Contribution  
  All  NASDAQ  NYSE 
Size Class  2010 2007 2005  2010 2007 2005  2010 2007 2005 
< 100 Shares 
 
100 - 500 
 
501 – 900 
 
901 – 1,900 
 
1,901 – 4,900 
 
4,901 – 9,999 
 
> 10,000 
 
 0.1856 
 
0.4909 
 
0.0111 
 
0.0096 
 
0.0036 
 
0.0005 
 
0.0004 
 
0.1336        
 
0.2650       
 
-0.0186        
 
0.0069        
 
0.0025        
 
0.0006     
 
0.0001        
0.1048 
 
0.3887 
 
0.0104 
 
0.0080 
 
0.0019 
 
0.0004 
 
0.0001 
      
 0.3188        
 
0.6379        
 
0.0189        
 
0.0164       
 
0.0064       
 
0.0008       
 
0.0008     
0.3696       
 
0.5857       
 
0.0181        
 
0.0181        
 
0.0067        
 
0.0015     
 
0.0004      
0.2010       
 
0.7604        
 
0.0202     
 
0.0142       
 
0.0036        
 
0.0005      
 
0.0002        
 0.2257       
 
0.7429        
 
0.0139        
 
0.0123       
 
0.0044        
 
0.0008        
 
0.0003 
 
0.1795       
 
0.7802        
 
0.0170        
 
0.0159        
 
0.0058        
 
0.0014        
 
0.0002      
0.2056       
 
0.7499        
 
0.0210        
 
0.0177        
 
0.0042        
 
0.0013        
 
0.0003      
Table 7 lists the weighted price contribution for seven trade size classes: less than 100 shares, 100 to 500 shares, 501 to 900 
shares, 901 to 1900 shares, 1901 to 4900 shares, 4901 to 9999 shares, and over 10,000 shares for trades occurring on NASDAQ 
from July through December 2010, 2007, and 2005 for all stocks, NASDAQ-listed stocks, and NYSE-listed stocks. 
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Table 8.  Differences in Weighted Price Contributions 
Panel A:  All Stocks 
Size Class  2010-2007  2007-2005  2010-2005 
< 100 Shares  0.0520*  0.0288***  0.0808*** 
   (0.078)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
        
100-500  0.2259***  -0.1237***  0.1022*** 
   (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
        
501-900  0.0297  -0.0290  0.0007 
   (0.255)  (0.267)  (0.458) 
        
901-1,900  0.0027***  -0.0011*  0.0016*** 
  (<.0001)   (0.052)  (0.001) 
        
1,901-4,900  0.0011***  0.0006***  0.0017*** 
   (<.0001)  (0.005)  (<.0001) 
        
4,901-9,999  -0.0001  0.0002**  0.0001 
   (0.819)  (0.039)  (0.209) 
        
> 10,000  0.0003***  0.0000  0.0003** 
  (<.0001)  (0.129)  (0.021) 
 
Panel B: NASDAQ Listed Stocks 
Size Class  2010-2007  2007-2005  2010-2005 
< 100 Shares  -0.0508  0.1686***  0.1178*** 
   (0.135)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
        
100-500  0.0522  -0.1747***  -0.1225*** 
   (0.115)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
        
501-900  0.0008  -0.0021  -0.0013 
  (0.510)   (0.308)  (0.510) 
        
901-1,900  -0.0017*  0.0039***  0.0022** 
   (0.098)  (<.0001)  (0.011) 
        
1,901-4,900  -0.0003  0.0031***  0.0028*** 
   (0.503)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
        
4,901-9,999  -0.0007***  0.0010***  0.0003 
   (0.009)  (<.0001)  (0.290) 
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> 10,000  0.0004  0.0002***  0.0006** 
  (0.237)  (<.0001)  (0.079) 
 
Panel C: NYSE Listed Stocks 
Size Class  2010-2007  2007-2005  2010-2005 
< 100 Shares  0.0462***  -0.0261*  0.0201* 
  (0.002)   (0.097)  (0.088) 
        
100-500  -0.0373**  0.0303*  -0.0070 
  (0.011)  (0.054)  (0.549) 
        
501-900  -0.0031***  -0.0040  -0.0071** 
   (0.001)  (0.222)  (0.030) 
        
901-1,900  -0.0036***  -0.0018  -0.0054*** 
   (<.0001)  (0.254)  (0.001) 
        
1,901-4,900  -0.0014***  0.0016***  0.0002 
   (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.740) 
        
4,901-9,999  -0.0006***  0.0001  -0.0005*** 
   (<.0001)  (0.634)  (0.005) 
        
> 10,000  0.0001  -0.0001  0.0000 
  (0.231)  (0.438)  (0.969) 
Table 8 lists the differences in the weighted price contribution for seven trade size classes: less 
than 100 shares, 100 to 500 shares, 501 to 900 shares, 901 to 1900 shares, 1901 to 4900 shares, 
4901 to 9999 shares, and over 10,000 shares between 2010 and 2007, 2007 and 2005, and 
2010 and 2005 for trades occurring on NASDAQ from July through December 2010, 2007, and 
2005.  Panel A lists the differences in weighted price contribution for all stocks, Panel B lists the 
differences in weighted price contribution for NASDAQ-listed stocks, and Panel C lists the 
differences in weighted price contribution for NYSE-listed stocks.  P-values from standard t-
tests testing the differences in the means are reported in parentheses. ***, ** & * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% & 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9.  Price Contribution vs. Proportion of Trades by Size Class 
Panel A: 2010 
  All  NASDAQ  NYSE 
Size Class  PC %Vol diff  PC %Vol diff  PC %Vol diff 
< 100 Shares 
 
 
100 - 500 
 
 
501 – 900 
 
 
901 – 1900 
 
 
1,901 – 4,900 
 
 
4,901 – 9,999 
 
 
> 10,000 
 0.2263 
 
 
0.6965 
 
 
0.0252 
 
 
0.0353 
 
 
0.0299 
 
 
0.0072 
 
 
0.0199 
0.0797 
 
 
0.7666 
 
 
0.0646 
 
 
0.0710 
 
 
0.0790 
 
 
0.0654 
 
 
0.0930 
0.1465*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0701*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0395*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0357*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0491*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0582*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0731*** 
(<.0001) 
 
 0.2918 
 
 
0.6132 
 
 
0.0312 
 
 
0.0457 
 
 
0.0343 
 
 
0.0020 
 
 
0.0271 
0.0817 
 
 
0.7539 
 
 
0.0660 
 
 
0.0725 
 
 
0.0823 
 
 
0.0707 
 
 
0.1020 
0.2102*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.1407*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0348*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0268*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0480*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0686*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0748*** 
(<.0001) 
 0.1768 
 
 
0.7593 
 
 
0.0205 
 
 
0.0271 
 
 
0.0263 
 
 
0.0116 
 
 
0.0139 
0.0786 
 
 
0.7762 
 
 
0.0636 
 
 
0.0698 
 
 
0.0763 
 
 
0.0609 
 
 
0.0855 
0.0982*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0169* 
(.0600) 
 
-0.0431*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0427*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0500*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0494*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0717*** 
(<.0001) 
  N=424,832  N=181,888  N=242,944 
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Panel B: 2007 
  All  NASDAQ  NYSE 
Size Class  PC %Vol diff  PC %Vol diff  PC %Vol diff 
< 100 Shares 
 
 
100 - 500 
 
 
501 – 900 
 
 
901 – 1900 
 
 
1,901 – 4,900 
 
 
4,901 – 9,999 
 
 
> 10,000 
 
 0.2686 
 
 
0.6524 
 
 
0.0193 
 
 
0.0344 
 
 
0.0214 
 
 
0.0077 
 
 
-0.0024 
0.0566 
 
 
0.7558 
 
 
0.0673 
 
 
0.0657 
 
 
0.0635 
 
 
0.0461 
 
 
0.0593 
0.2120*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.1034*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0479*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0313*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0421*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0383*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0617*** 
(<.0001) 
 
 0.3236 
 
 
0.5801 
 
 
0.0345 
 
 
0.0391 
 
 
0.0294 
 
 
0.0115 
 
 
-0.0025 
 
0.0693 
 
 
0.7262 
 
 
0.0719 
 
 
0.0776 
 
 
0.0869 
 
 
0.0685 
 
 
0.0854 
 
0.2543*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.1460*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0374*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0385*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0575*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0570*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0880*** 
(<.0001) 
 0.1582 
 
 
0.7699 
 
 
0.0278 
 
 
0.0329 
 
 
0.0196 
 
 
0.0118 
 
 
0.0126 
0.0447 
 
 
0.7758 
 
 
0.0698 
 
 
0.0779 
 
 
0.0807 
 
 
0.0632 
 
 
0.0682 
0.1136*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0060 
(.5932) 
 
-0.0420*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0451*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0610*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0514*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0557*** 
(<.0001) 
  N=485,902  N=241,427  N=244,475 
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Panel C: 2005 
  All  NASDAQ  NYSE 
Size Class  PC %Vol diff  PC %Vol diff  PC %Vol diff 
< 100 Shares 
 
 
100 - 500 
 
 
501 – 900 
 
 
901 – 1900 
 
 
1,901 – 4,900 
 
 
4,901 – 9,999 
 
 
> 10,000 
 
 0.1827 
 
 
0.7474 
 
 
0.0278 
 
 
0.0354 
 
 
0.0168 
 
 
0.0173 
 
 
0.0143 
0.0551 
 
 
0.7718 
 
 
0.0857 
 
 
0.0933 
 
 
0.0947 
 
 
0.0723 
 
 
0.0909 
0.1276*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0244*** 
(.0075) 
 
-0.0579*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0579*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0778*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0550*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0766*** 
(<.0001) 
 
 0.1743 
 
 
0.7477 
 
 
0.0270 
 
 
0.0373 
 
 
0.0167 
 
 
0.0141 
 
 
0.0114 
0.0553 
 
 
0.7639 
 
 
0.0806 
 
 
0.0904 
 
 
0.0935 
 
 
0.0701 
 
 
0.0789 
0.1189*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0162 
(.1416) 
 
-0.0536*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0532*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0768*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0561*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0674*** 
(<.0001) 
 0.2035 
 
 
0.7901 
 
 
0.0302 
 
 
0.0298 
 
 
0.0174 
 
 
0.0355 
 
 
0.0262 
0.0548 
 
 
0.7460 
 
 
0.0987 
 
 
0.1019 
 
 
0.1004 
 
 
0.0842 
 
 
0.1415 
0.1487*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0441*** 
(.0065) 
 
-0.0685*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0721*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0829*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0487*** 
(.0061) 
 
-0.1154*** 
(<.0001) 
  N=253,873  N=177,927  N=75,946 
Table 9 lists the price contribution (PC), proportion of volume (%Vol), and difference (diff) between PC and %Vol for trade size 
classes of less than 100 shares, 100 to 500 shares, 501 to 900 shares, 901 to 1900 shares, 1901 to 4900 shares, 4901 to 9999 
shares, and over 10,000 shares for all trades occurring on NASDAQ from July through December, 2010, 2007 and 2005 for all 
stocks, NASDAQ-listed stocks, and NYSE-listed stocks, with 2010 results in Panel A, 2007 results in Panel B, and 2005 results in 
Panel C.  P-values of the t-test that diff is significantly different from zero appear in parentheses.  ***, ** & * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% & 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10.  Weighted Least Squares Regression: PC on Trade Size Class and Proportion of Volume 
Panel A: 2010 
Variable  All Stocks  NASDAQ  NYSE 
Trade Size 
       < 100 shares 
 
 
       100+ shares 
 
 
% Volume 
 
 
% Trades 
 
  
0.1764*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0270*** 
(<.0001) 
 
0.9094*** 
(<.0001) 
 
0.0370*** 
(<.0001) 
 
0.0075*** 
(<.0001) 
 
 
 
 
0.9396*** 
(<.0001) 
 
  
0.2373*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0236*** 
(<.0001) 
 
0.8401*** 
(<.0001) 
 
0.0938*** 
(<.0001) 
 
0.0044** 
(0.016) 
 
 
 
 
0.8918*** 
(<.0001) 
  
0.1330*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0287*** 
(<.0001) 
 
0.9560*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0025 
(0.2181) 
 
0.0113*** 
(<.0001) 
 
 
 
 
0.9682*** 
(<.0001) 
R2  0.1148 0.1194  0.0811 0.0864  0.1502 0.1532 
 
Panel B: 2007 
Variable  All Stocks  NASDAQ  NYSE 
Trade Size 
        < 100 shares 
 
 
          100+ shares 
 
 
% Volume 
 
 
% Trades 
  
0.2788*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0564*** 
(<.0001) 
 
0.9401*** 
(<.0001) 
 
0.1649*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0230** 
(0.014) 
 
 
 
 
0.9244*** 
  
0.3023*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0310*** 
(<.0001) 
 
0.8114*** 
(<.0001) 
 
0.1798*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0096*** 
(<.0001) 
 
 
 
 
0.8557*** 
  
0.1231*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0339*** 
(<.0001) 
 
0.9943*** 
(<.0001) 
 
0.0176*** 
(<.0001) 
 
0.0092*** 
(<.0001) 
 
 
 
 
0.9510*** 
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 (<.0001) 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
R2  0.0016 0.0017  0.0521 0.0587  0.1053 0.1099 
 
Panel C: 2005 
Variable  All Stocks  NASDAQ  NYSE 
Trade Size 
        < 100 shares 
 
 
        100+ shares 
 
 
% Volume 
 
 
% Trades 
 
  
0.1475*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0423*** 
(<.0001) 
 
0.9784*** 
(<.0001) 
 
0.0092*** 
(0.001) 
 
0.0145*** 
(<.0001) 
 
 
 
 
0.9486*** 
(<.0001) 
 
  
0.1373*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0424*** 
(<.0001) 
 
0.9959*** 
(<.0001) 
 
0.0296*** 
(<.0001) 
 
0.0049*** 
(0.004) 
 
 
 
 
0.9551*** 
(<.0001) 
  
0.1621*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0426*** 
(<.0001) 
 
0.9532*** 
(<.0001) 
 
-0.0276*** 
(<.0001) 
 
0.0346*** 
(<.0001) 
 
 
 
 
0.9379*** 
(<.0001) 
R2  0.1053 0.1095  0.1252 0.1306  0.0804 0.0832 
Table 10 lists the results of weighted least squares regressions with price contribution (PC) of trade size classes as the 
dependent variable and the ratio of daily stock returns to daily market returns as the weight.  The independent variables are a 
dummy set to one if the size class is less than 100 shares and zero otherwise, a dummy variable set to one if the size class is 
greater than 100 shares and zero otherwise, the size class proportion of volume in columns one, three, and five, and the size 
class proportion of trades in columns two, four, and six for all stocks, NASDAQ-listed stocks, and NYSE-listed stocks for trades 
occurring July through December, 2010, 2007, and 2005.  2010 results are listed in Panel A, 2007 results are listed in Panel B, 
and 2005 results are listed in Panel C.  P-values are reported in parentheses.  ***, ** & * denote significance at the 1%, 5% & 
10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 11. Weighted Least Squares Regression: Price Contribution with Panel Data 
Panel A: All Stocks 
Variable  2010 & 2007  2007 & 2005  2010 & 2005 
Intercept  -0.0517*** -0.0249***  -0.0366*** 0.0175**  -0.0291*** 0.0158*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.0143)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
2010  0.0215** 0.0339***     -0.0059*** -0.0093*** 
  (0.0028) (<.0001)     (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
2007     -0.0247*** -0.0432***    
     (0.0060) (<.0001)    
          
<100 shares  0.3318*** 0.1880***  0.1852*** -0.0060  0.1791*** -0.0056** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.6357)  (<.0001) (0.0180) 
          
<100*2010  -0.1264*** -0.1586***     0.0295*** 0.0350*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)     (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
<100*2007     0.1535*** 0.1941***    
     (<.0001) (<.0001)    
          
% Volume  0.9206***   0.9608***   0.9374***  
  (<.0001)   (<.0001)   (<.0001)  
          
% Trades   0.9336***   0.9375***   0.9436*** 
   (<.0001)   (<.0001)   (<.0001) 
          
R2  0.0025 0.0028  0.0022 0.0024  0.0673 0.0721 
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Panel B: NASDAQ Listed Stocks 
Variable  2010 & 2007  2007 & 2005  2010 & 2005 
Intercept  -0.0347*** -0.0133***  -0.0146*** 0.0178***  -0.0185*** 0.0128*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
2010  0.0149*** 0.0220***     -0.0260*** -0.0159*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)     (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
2007     -0.0393*** -0.0381***    
     (<.0001) (<.0001)    
          
<100 shares  0.3357*** 0.1893***  0.1579 0.0207***  0.1610*** 0.0223*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
<100*2010  -0.0773*** -0.0994***     0.1134*** 0.0663*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)     (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
<100*2007     0.1906*** 0.1683***    
     (<.0001) (<.0001)    
          
% Volume  0.8260***   0.9025***   0.9157***  
  (<.0001)   (<.0001)   (<.0001)  
          
% Trades   0.8730***   0.9057***   0.9250*** 
   (<.0001)   (<.0001)   (<.0001) 
          
R2  0.0370 0.0432  0.0467 0.0534  0.0606 0.0665 
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Panel C: NYSE Listed Stocks 
Variable  2010 & 2007  2007 & 2005  2010 & 2005 
Intercept  -0.0288*** 0.0073***  -0.0507*** 0.0324***  -0.0431*** 0.0301*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
2010  -0.0057*** 0.0063***     0.0148*** -0.0150*** 
  (.001) (.001)     (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
2007     0.0220*** -0.0218***    
     (<.0001) (<.0001)    
          
<100 shares  0.1530*** 0.0089***  0.2117*** -0.0619***  0.2052*** -0.0616*** 
  (<.0001) (.001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
<100*2010  0.0126*** -0.0228***     -0.0437*** 0.0477*** 
  (.001) (<.0001)     (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
<100*2007     -0.0588*** 0.0699***    
     (<.0001) (<.0001)    
          
% Volume  0.9755***   0.9752***   0.9547***  
  (<.0001)   (<.0001)   (<.0001)  
          
% Trades   0.9588***   0.9451***   0.9532*** 
   (<.0001)   (<.0001)   (<.0001) 
          
R2  0.0806 0.0847  0.0569 0.0606  0.0626 0.0656 
Table 11 lists the results of weighted least squares regressions with price contribution (PC) of trade size classes as the 
dependent variable and the ratio of daily stock returns to daily market returns as the weight.  The independent variables are a 
dummy variable set to one if the year of the observation is in 2010 and zero otherwise for columns one, two, five and six, a 
dummy variable set to one if the observation is in 2007 and zero otherwise for columns three and four, a dummy variable set to 
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one if the size class is less than 100 shares and zero otherwise, an interaction term set to one if the trades size class is equal to 
one and the year of the observation is 2010 and zero otherwise for columns one, two, four, and five, an interaction term set to 
one if the trades size class is equal to one and the year of the observation is 2007 and zero otherwise for columns three and 
four, the size class proportion of volume in columns one, three, and five, and the size class proportion of trades in columns two, 
four, and six for all trades executing on NASDAQ for July through December 2010, 2007, and 2005.  Column one and two report 
results from 2010 and 2007.  Columns three and four report results from 2007 and 2005.  Columns five and six report results 
from 2010 and 2005.  Panel A reports results for all stocks, Panel B reports results for NASDAQ-listed stocks, and Panel C reports 
results for NYSE-listed stocks.  P-values are reported in parentheses.  ***, ** & * denote significance at the 1%, 5% & 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 12. Regression: Volume and Trades on Intraday Intervals 
Panel A: 2010 
   All Transactions  Odd Lot Transactions  % Odd Lot Transactions 
Variable  Volume Trades  Volume Trades  Volume Trades 
Intercept  1,876,763.81*** 78,305.57***  10,918.60*** 1,850.21***  0.0426*** 0.1683*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Period 1  3,523,935.47*** 84,913.49***  15,607.35*** 1,939.10***  -0.0128*** -0.0273*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Period 2  2,784,498.79*** 72,580.02***  14,040.47*** 1,621.73***  -0.0095*** -0.0285*** 
  (<.0001) (0.001)  (<.0001) (0.004)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Period 3  3,035,492.25*** 92,893.60***  15,827.77*** 2,095.09***  -0.0070*** -0.0212*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Period 4  1,938,158.91*** 59,907.59***  10,308.01*** 1,357.09**  -0.0057*** -0.0176*** 
  (<.0001) (0.006)  (<.0001) (0.016)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Period 5  1,714,415.82*** 55,181.62**  9,294.88*** 1,267.35**  -0.0047*** -0.0145*** 
  (<.0001) (0.012)  (<.0001) (0.025)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Period 6  1,240,464.99*** 41,993.27*  6,784.59*** 955.14*  -0.0035*** -0.0107*** 
  (0.004) (0.056)  (<.0001) (0.090)  (<.0001) (0.009) 
Period 7  1,182,362.28*** 40,284.35*  6,514.68*** 936.47*  -0.0031*** -0.0089** 
  (0.006) (0.066)  (<.0001) (0.096)  (<.0001) (0.030) 
Period 8  817,076.90* 28,874.73  4,522.35*** 649.77  -0.0019** -0.0063 
  (0.059) (0.188)  (0.007) (0.248)  (0.011) (0.123) 
Period 9  718,348.96* 25,164.70  3,892.52** 592.56  -0.0020*** -0.0046 
  (0.096) (0.251)  (0.020) (0.292)  (0.008) (0.266) 
Period 10  394,975.27 14,920.86  2,149.55 361.94  -0.0008 -0.0006 
  (0.360) (0.496)  (0.198) (0.520)  (0.266) (0.882) 
Period 11  264,011.31 8,372.01  1,364.95 208.04  -0.0013* -0.0018 
  (0.541) (0.702)  (0.413) (0.711)  (0.096) (0.658) 
Period 12  24,902.59 246.13  110.13 24.26  -0.0004 -0.0011 
  (0.954) (0.991)  (0.947) (0.966)  (0.557) (0.791) 
Period 14  -30,692.85 -822.47  -240.94 -19.27  -0.0000 0.0006 
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  (0.943) (0.970)  (0.885) (0.973)  (0.969) (0.876) 
Period 15  32,772.30 -715.48  67.03 -31.49  -0.0015** -0.0048 
  (0.939) (0.974)  (0.968) (0.955)  (0.048) (0.240) 
Period 16  -21,726.45 -1,709.68  -140.95 -43.35  -0.0007 -0.0022 
  (0.960) (0.938)  (0.933) (0.939)  (0.331) (0.596) 
Period 17  13,714.15 -180.01  59.76 -10.03  -0.0009 -0.0016 
  (0.975) (0.993)  (0.971) (0.986)  (0.252) (0.690) 
Period 18  76,396.08 544.96  283.58 6.99  -0.0013* -0.0023 
  (0.859) (0.980)  (0.865) (0.990)  (0.096) (0.573) 
Period 19  467,139.78 15,364.07  2,429.44 367.05  -0.0012 -0.0009 
  (0.279) (0.483)  (0.146) (0.514)  (0.121) (0.832) 
Period 20  607,987.71 18,324.88  3,175.77* 413.42  -0.0019** -0.0048 
  (0.159) (0.403)  (0.057) (0.462)  (0.013) (0.237) 
Period 21  639,605.61 20,641.39  3,395.09** 477.32  -0.0019** -0.0046 
  (0.139) (0.346)  (0.042) (0.396)  (0.014) (0.261) 
Period 22  569,376.84 21,710.76  3,250.06* 487.94  -0.0006 -0.0030 
  (0.187) (0.322)  (0.052) (0.386)  (0.400) (0.457) 
Period 23  1,069,286.61** 36,478.78*  5,813.38*** 832.29  -0.0027*** -0.0080* 
  (0.014) (0.096)  (0.001) (0.139)  (0.001) (0.050) 
Period 24  1,362,354.94*** 51,378.90**  7,492.85*** 1,183.50**  -0.0015** -0.0031 
  (0.002) (0.019)  (<.0001) (0.036)  (0.045) (0.441) 
Period 25  2,364,532.41*** 90,060.41***  13,101.82*** 2,046.76***  -0.0017** -0.0042 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.028) (0.301) 
Period 26  6,644,732.94*** 321,344.36***  33,124.81*** 7,719.46***  0.0037*** 0.0337*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
R2  0.6330 0.5541  0.7407 0.5173  0.7213 0.5252 
 
Panel B: 2007 
   All Transactions  Odd Lot Transactions  % Odd Lot Transactions 
Variable  Volume Trades  Volume Trades  Volume Trades 
Intercept  3,157,881.89*** 91,933.40***  15,947.08*** 2,140.98***  0.0288*** 0.1298*** 
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  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Period 1  2,686,267.19*** 108,376.72***  11,944.73*** 2,858.97***  0.0041*** 0.0412*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Period 2  2,960,358.01*** 82,761.75***  14,168.95*** 2,066.36***  -0.0006 0.0067* 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.378) (0.055) 
Period 3  2,751,991.01*** 73,381.25***  13,254.01*** 1,801.09***  -0.0012* 0.0026 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.068) (0.449) 
Period 4  1,871,428.30*** 46,559.90***  9,076.88*** 1,107.74***  -0.0015** -0.0023 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.020) (0.497) 
Period 5  1,742,884.11*** 48,879.69***  8,552.49*** 1,168.49***  -0.0007 0.0014 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.306) (0.693) 
Period 6  1,321,760.32*** 37,517.03***  6,260.66*** 921.13***  -0.0005 0.0029 
  (<.0001) (0.002)  (<.0001) (0.002)  (0.401) (0.396) 
Period 7  1,186,550.83*** 35,032.80***  5,743.93*** 842.23***  -0.0002 0.0027 
  (<.0001) (0.003)  (<.0001) (0.004)  (0.754) (0.442) 
Period 8  723,908.27*** 20,336.72*  3,532.09*** 480.89*  -0.0004 -0.0000 
  (0.007) (0.087)  (<.0001) (0.096)  (0.496) (0.993) 
Period 9  579,400.16** 19,029.09  2,856.64*** 471.60  0.0002 0.0035 
  (0.030) (0.110)  (0.003) (0.103)  (0.806) (0.309) 
Period 10  305,992.00 8,998.25  1,455.87 228.50  -0.0001 0.0025 
  (0.252) (0.449)  (0.133) (0.429)  (0.828) (0.467) 
Period 11  269,968.89 8,360.53  1,403.24 200.09  -0.0001 0.0000 
  (0.312) (0.482)  (0.148) (0.488)  (0.840) (0.991) 
Period 12  34,361.06 1,955.55  142.51 42.41  -0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.897) (0.869)  (0.883) (0.883)  (0.849) (0.981) 
Period 14  3,265.46 1,468.11  -14.14 50.62  0.0002 0.0019 
  (0.990) (0.902)  (0.988) (0.861)  (0.805) (0.587) 
Period 15  27,996.71 1,227.04  76.40 32.32  -0.0005 0.0004 
  (0.916) (0.918)  (0.937) (0.911)  (0.454) (0.902) 
Period 16  60,452.21 2,660.62  205.03 74.97  -0.0000 0.0048 
  (0.821) (0.823)  (0.832) (0.795)  (0.995) (0.166) 
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Period 17  62,267.71 2,157.96  291.77 61.34  -0.0000 0.0035 
  (0.815) (0.856)  (0.763) (0.832)  (0.970) (0.307) 
Period 18  239,685.46 6,678.93  1,067.10 146.45  -0.0001 0.0028 
  (0.369) (0.574)  (0.271) (0.612)  (0.888) (0.410) 
Period 19  672,567.25** 20,542.22*  3,437.22*** 484.24*  0.0007 0.0053 
  (0.012) (0.084)  (<.0001) (0.094)  (0.280) (0.128) 
Period 20  1,012,875.19*** 33,680.50***  5,081.17*** 814.03***  0.0015** 0.0070** 
  (<.0001) (0.005)  (<.0001) (0.005)  (0.026) (0.045) 
Period 21  1,053,527.25*** 32,456.55***  5,331.27*** 758.02***  0.0006 0.0053 
  (<.0001) (0.007)  (<.0001) (0.009)  (0.394) (0.125) 
Period 22  1,049,292.37*** 35,381.39***  5,364.02*** 843.64***  0.0017** 0.0101*** 
  (<.0001) (0.003)  (<.0001) (0.004)  (0.012) (0.004) 
Period 23  1,846,157.28*** 56,441.13***  9,150.67*** 1,351.91***  0.0014** 0.0093*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.039) (0.007) 
Period 24  2,162,893.82*** 67,822.49***  10,663.73*** 1,601.86***  0.0020*** 0.0106*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Period 25  3,436,746.36*** 104,167.98***  16,793.34*** 2,407.71***  0.0011 0.0085** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.106) (0.014) 
Period 26  7,272,618.19*** 247,996.12***  31,069.19*** 5,782.62***  0.0037*** 0.0327*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
R2  0.8340 0.7372  0.8823 0.7276  0.3656 0.5249 
 
Panel C: 2005 
   All Transactions  Odd Lot Transactions  % Odd Lot Transactions 
Variable  Volume Trades  Volume Trades  Volume Trades 
Intercept  844,603.80*** 17,514.59***  3,319.80*** 487.12***  0.0208*** 0.1392*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Period 1  1,044,443.57*** 17,089.14***  3,219.18*** 382.85***  -0.0026*** -0.0096*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Period 2  984,697.79*** 16,983.08***  3,499.46*** 490.54***  -0.0018*** 0.0005 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.832) 
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Period 3  893,143.94*** 16,962.88***  3,293.17*** 510.31***  -0.0009* 0.0063*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.070) (0.005) 
Period 4  680,820.12*** 13,239.70***  2,533.99*** 398.85***  -0.0006 0.0063*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.226) (0.005) 
Period 5  621,408.31*** 11,618.83***  2,346.69*** 360.22***  -0.0009* 0.0038* 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.062) (0.087) 
Period 6  446,017.70*** 9,367.32***  1,724.62*** 296.41***  -0.0000 0.0081*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.918) (<.0001) 
Period 7  359,883.40*** 7,171.61***  1,418.94*** 210.40***  -0.0003 0.0018 
  (<.0001) (0.001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.598) (0.421) 
Period 8  243,639.35*** 4,902.09**  958.19*** 150.57***  -0.0002 0.0017 
  (0.001) (0.022)  (<.0001) (0.002)  (0.679) (0.458) 
Period 9  196,731.21*** 3,369.97  729.87*** 87.76*  -0.0008* -0.0038* 
  (0.005) (0.115)  (0.001) (0.075)  (0.095) (0.089) 
Period 10  139,102.20** 2,710.12  504.11** 75.87  -0.0004 -0.0002 
  (0.046) (0.204)  (0.019) (0.124)  (0.451) (0.946) 
Period 11  109,854.46 2,611.42  452.88** 83.23*  0.0001 0.0026 
  (0.115) (0.221)  (0.036) (0.092)  (0.916) (0.255) 
Period 12  40,033.22 1,254.56  166.54 34.69  0.0003 0.0035 
  (0.565) (0.557)  (0.438) (0.481)  (0.589) (0.118) 
Period 14  -19,823.30 230.04  -87.75 -4.23  0.0006 0.0012 
  (0.776) (0.914)  (0.683) (0.931)  (0.209) (0.589) 
Period 15  5,171.56 -328.91  -15.57 -7.27  -0.0006 -0.0024 
  (0.941) (0.877)  (0.942) (0.883)  (0.220) (0.282) 
Period 16  10,920.70 -71.84  -21.53 -2.85  -0.0005 -0.0010 
  (0.875) (0.973)  (0.920) (0.954)  (0.343) (0.642) 
Period 17  57,496.93 1,651.46  225.84 48.12  0.0003 0.0016 
  (0.409) (0.439)  (0.293) (0.329)  (0.498) (0.464) 
Period 18  69,230.74 2,065.00  240.96 61.58  0.0003 0.0028 
  (0.320) (0.333)  (0.262) (0.212)  (0.585) (0.218) 
Period 19  187,277.56*** 4,256.94**  725.25*** 121.89**  0.0001 0.0013 
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  (0.007) (0.047)  (0.001) (0.014)  (0.814) (0.556) 
Period 20  260,242.98*** 5,797.38***  979.95*** 166.37***  0.0008 0.0020 
  (<.0001) (0.007)  (<.0001) (0.001)  (0.108) (0.376) 
Period 21  278,793.12*** 6,639.73***  1,156.91*** 172.02***  0.0013*** 0.0003 
  (<.0001) (0.002)  (<.0001) (0.001)  (0.009) (0.885) 
Period 22  294,705.71*** 7,622.46***  1,224.17*** 190.31***  0.0012** 0.0020 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.018) (0.364) 
Period 23  453,299.62*** 10,858.83***  1,838.57*** 275.85***  0.0010** 0.0010 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.038) (0.642) 
Period 24  573,156.03*** 14,454.12***  2,327.78*** 361.31***  0.0016*** 0.0033 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.001) (0.139) 
Period 25  900,694.34*** 21,570.21***  3,487.91*** 534.97***  0.0019*** 0.0053** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.018) 
Period 26  1,779,920.56*** 47,448.91***  5,989.55*** 1,118.95***  0.0048*** 0.0277*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
R2  0.8432 0.7615  0.8708 0.7819  0.5315 0.5223 
Table 12 reports the results of regressions with the average total volume, total number of trades, odd lot volume, number of 
odd lot trades, odd lot proportion of volume, and odd lot proportion of trades for the minute of the trading day as the 
dependent variables.  The independent variables are dummy variables set to one if the minute of the trading day is during the 
15 minute interval, and zero otherwise.  Panel A reports results for 2010, Panel B reports results for 2007, and Panel C reports 
results for 2005.  P-values are reported in parentheses.  ***, ** & * denote significance at the 1%, 5% & 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 13. Regression: Volume and Trades on Day-of-the-Week 
Panel A: 2010 
   All Transactions  Odd Lot Transactions  % Odd Lot Transactions 
Variable  Volume Trades  Volume Trades  Volume Trades 
Intercept  370,691.84*** 2,023.28***  14,250.62*** 333.06***  0.0811*** 0.2174*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
Monday  -55,736.25*** -281.84***  -1,396.67*** -32.30***  0.0021*** 0.0042*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
Tuesday  14,911.46* 70.58***  524.78*** 13.58***  -0.0002 -0.0005 
  (0.061) (0.003)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.401) (0.411) 
          
Thursday  12,256.25 53.98**  96.10 5.77*  -0.0019*** -0.0041*** 
  (0.123) (0.023)  (0.497) (0.081)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
Friday  -21,973.56*** -124.59***  -957.96*** -19.74***  -0.0004 0.0020*** 
  (0.006) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.133) (0.001) 
          
R2  0.0002 0.0007  0.0006 0.0006  0.0004 0.0005 
 
Panel B: 2007 
   All Transactions  Odd Lot Transactions  % Odd Lot Transactions 
Variable  Volume Trades  Volume Trades  Volume Trades 
Intercept  489,103.06*** 2,408.45***  14,132.24*** 333.87***  0.0539*** 0.1593*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
Monday  -80,424.45*** -357.62***  -1,481.68*** -38.20***  0.0049*** 0.0114*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
Tuesday  -21,689.80* -100.34***  76.10 -0.41  0.0042*** 0.0114*** 
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  (0.054) (0.001)  (0.632) (0.911)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
Thursday  12,972.87 54.98*  588.94*** 12.96***  0.0017*** 0.0047*** 
  (0.249) (0.062)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
Friday  -30,230.78*** -130.04***  42.86 1.11  0.0056*** 0.0133*** 
  (0.007) (<.0001)  (0.786) (0.760)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
R2  0.0002 0.0005  0.0004 0.0005  0.0017 0.0018 
 
Panel C: 2005 
   All Transactions  Odd Lot Transactions  % Odd Lot Transactions 
Variable  Volume Trades  Volume Trades  Volume Trades 
Intercept  263,054.99*** 1,002.40***  5,523.64*** 156.72***  0.0553*** 0.1923*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
Monday  -31,173.88*** -94.34***  -387.04*** -20.21***  -0.0000 -0.0041*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.995) (<.0001) 
          
Tuesday  -16,536.72** -53.20***  -216.06*** -10.60***  0.0005 -0.0002 
  (0.048) (0.002)  (0.005) (<.0001)  (0.194) (0.879) 
          
Thursday  3,695.09 17.30  127.09* -0.76  0.0001 -0.0029*** 
  (0.662) (0.330)  (0.099) (0.721)  (0.830) (0.005) 
          
Friday  -46,439.37*** -172.82***  -948.18*** -34.47***  -0.0012*** -0.0095*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
R2  0.0002 0.0006  0.0010 0.0015  0.0001 0.0005 
Table 13 reports the results of regressions with total volume, total number of trades, odd lot volume, number of odd lot trades, 
odd lot proportion of volume, and odd lot proportion of trades for stock days as the dependent variables.  The independent 
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variables are dummies set to one if the stock day falls on the day of the week, and zero otherwise.  Panel A reports the results 
for 2010, Panel B reports the results for 2007, and Panel C reports the results for 2005.  P-values are reported in parentheses.  
***, ** & * denote significance at the 1%, 5% & 10% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1.  Intraday Volume and Number of Trades: 2010, 2007, & 2005 
Panel A: Total Volume and Number of Trades 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Panel B:  Odd Lot Volume and Number of Trades 
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Panel C: Odd Lot Proportions of Volume and Number of Trades 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 graphs volume and number of trades over the minute of the trading day for trades executed on NASDAQ from July 
through December, 2010, 2007, and 2005.  Panel A graphs total volume and number of trades.  Panel B graphs odd lot volume 
and number of trades.  Panel C graphs odd lot proportions of volume and trades. 
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Figure 2.  Intraweek Volume and Number of Trades: 2010, 2007, & 2005 
Panel A: Total Volume and Number of Trades 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B:  Odd Lot Volume and Number of Trades 
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Panel C: Odd Lot Proportions of Volume and Number of Trades 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 graphs volume and number of trades over the day-of-the-week for all trades executed on NASDAQ from July through 
December, 2010, 2007, and 2005.  Panel A graphs total volume and number of trades.  Panel B graphs odd lot volume and 
number of trades.  Panel C graphs odd lot proportions of volume and number of trades.
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ORDER IMBALANCE AND ODD LOT TRANSACTIONS
 62 
   
2.1 Introduction 
 The purpose of this study is to document the relation between order imbalances and 
returns while considering odd lot transactions.  Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) and 
Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) show a negative relation between order imbalances and 
lagged returns, a positive relation between order imbalances and contemporaneous returns, 
and a slightly positive relation between order imbalances and future returns.  The data used in 
their study, the NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ) and the Institute for the Study of Security Prices 
(ISSM) datasets, does not contain odd lot transactions (trades for less than 100 shares). O’Hara, 
Yao, and Ye (2011) show that odd lot transactions are a non-trivial portion of total transactions.  
Hence, we investigate the relation between odd lot order imbalances and returns using a 
dataset that includes odd lot transactions. 
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) investigate the relation between daily S&P 500 
order imbalances and daily S&P 500 returns.  The study, which extrapolates net buys and net 
sells from total volume, uses the intuition that days with heavy buying or selling supply 
different signals to the market than supplied by days where the two are relatively equal.   Total 
volume, which does not differentiate between buy volume and sell volume, does not capture all 
of the information contained in a day’s trades.  Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam’s results 
show a positive contemporaneous relation between returns and order imbalance, suggesting 
order imbalances cause price pressures.  They also find a negative relation between lagged 
returns and order imbalance, which is consistent with the inventory paradigm models described 
by Stoll (1978), Ho and Stoll (1983), and Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1995).  However, Chordia, 
Roll, and Subrahmanyam find that, for the overall market, there is no predictive power of 
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lagged order imbalances on current market returns.  Therefore, there is no opportunity for a 
profitable trading strategy using order imbalance. 
 Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) continue this line of research by investigating 
individual stock returns and their relation to individual stock order imbalance.  They find that 
there is some predictive power of lagged individual stock order imbalance on current individual 
stock returns and a profitable trading strategy is feasible.  However, they find any profits from 
such a strategy would likely be mitigated by transaction costs, thus rendering the strategy 
unprofitable. 
Both the Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) and Chordia and Subrahmanyam 
(2004) studies use the ISSM and TAQ databases for the period 1988 through 1998.  They use 
the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to categorize each transaction as a buy or a sell.  While Lee 
and Radhakrishna (2000) and Odders-White (2000) find the Lee-Ready algorithm to be 85-93% 
accurate and justify its use, Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000) find the algorithm to be only 75% 
accurate on NASDAQ stocks.  Our study employs the NASDAQ Total View ITCH database, which 
contains all trades that execute on NASDAQ, including odd lot transactions, and identifies buyer 
and seller initiated transactions, negating the need for an algorithm to sign trades.  O’Hara, Yao, 
and Ye (2011) argue that, due to the omission of odd lot transactions in the TAQ database, 
studies relying on TAQ may be biased since odd lot transactions comprise roughly 20% of 
transactions and 7% of volume.  They also find that odd lot transactions contain a higher 
cumulative price impact (25-35%) than their proportion of trades and volume would dictate.  
Since odd lot traders contribute to price formation, we seek to see if the conclusions of Chordia, 
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Roll and Subrahmanyam (2002) and Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) hold when considering 
the order imbalances of all NASDAQ transactions, including odd lot transactions.  
We also investigate the relation between returns and odd lot order imbalances, and 
compare this relation to that of returns and order imbalance of all transactions on NASDAQ.  
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) find a positive relation between order imbalance and 
current market returns and conclude that order imbalances exert price pressure on the market.    
Since odd lot transactions are such a small proportion of total volume (7% of volume according 
to O’Hara, Yao, and Ye, 2011), the price pressure of an odd lot trade is expected to be smaller 
than the price pressure of a 100+ share (trades for 100 shares or more).  Returns reflect the 
information in 100+ share trades because they exert more price pressure than odd lot trades.  If 
the information in odd lot trades is different from that in 100+ share trades, the relation 
between odd lot order imbalance and returns will likely be different.  This study will determine 
if and how the relation between order imbalance and returns and that between odd lot order 
imbalance and returns are different. 
 Significant changes in market microstructure have occurred since or during the time 
period (1988-1998) used by Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) and Chordia and 
Subrahmanyam (2004) to document the relation between order imbalances and returns.  For 
example, decimalization (Bessembinder, 2003; Chung, Van Ness, and Van Ness, 2004; Gibson, 
Singh, and Yerramilli, 2003; Chakravarty, Panchapagesan, and Wood, 2005; and Bacidore, 
Battalio, Jennings, and Farkas, 2001), NASDAQ market reforms (Barclay, Christie, Harris, Kandel 
and Schultz, 1999), increased competition (Goldstein, Shkilko, Van Ness, and Van Ness, 2008; 
Battalio, Hatch, and Jennings, 2004; Bessembinder, 2003), the rise of algorithmic trading 
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(Brogaard, 2010), faster trading (Boehmer, 2005; Boehmer, Jennings, and Wei, 2007), and 
technological advances such as the NYSE Hybrid (Hendershott and Moulton, 2010) all affect 
equity markets in varying ways. 
We have a dataset that includes odd lot trades and identifies trades as either buys or 
sells, and we use this database to re-examine the relation between order imbalances and 
returns.  In addition to examining order imbalances and the impact of the inclusion of odd lot 
transactions, we examine the relation of order imbalances and intraday patterns.  McInish, 
Wood, and Ord (1985) show that there is a U-shaped pattern of intraday returns.  Should the 
contemporaneous positive relation between order imbalances and returns  
(Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2002) hold, we expect to see a U-shaped pattern of 
intraday order imbalances. 
 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
 Previous literature uses odd lot transactions as a proxy for individual traders (Ritter, 
1998, and Dyl and Maberly, 1992) who are presumed to be uninformed traders (Odean, 1998; 
Baker and Wurgler, 2006; and Barber and Odean, 2000).  However, O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2011) 
find that odd lot transactions contain information and contribute significantly more to price 
contribution than their proportional share of volume or number of trades.  The 
disproportionate price contribution of odd lot traders leads us to believe that odd lot traders 
are not uninformed as previously thought.  Since odd lot trades contain information, we will re-
examine the relation between order imbalances and returns documented by Chorida, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam (2002, 2004) with a dataset that includes odd lot transactions.  We expect that 
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by using a dataset that contains all transactions, including odd lot transactions, we can better 
explain market and individual equity returns since we will be incorporating the information 
contained in all transactions into the study, not just information contained in 100+ share 
transactions.  We expect to see greater explanatory power reflected in larger coefficients of 
determination in regressions of returns on order imbalance when using a dataset containing 
odd lot transactions relative to the coefficients of determination in the regressions that use a 
dataset without odd lot transactions. 
Hypothesis 1 
H0: With the inclusion of odd lot transactions, order imbalance will be better able to explain 
market and individual equity returns than when odd lot transactions are not included in the 
analysis.   
  
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) conclude that investors are contrarian insofar 
as they are net buyers after stock market declines and net sellers after stock market gains.  We 
do not believe that odd lot traders will display different trading behavior from all other traders 
in response to positive or negative returns.  In other words, if all traders are net buyers, we 
assume that odd lot traders will also be net buyers and if all traders are net sellers, we assume 
that odd lot traders will also be net sellers.  We, therefore, predict that odd lot traders will 
display a contrarian behavior with regards to stock price increases and decreases.  We predict 
the direction of the relation between odd lot order imbalance and lagged returns will have the 
same direction as the relation between the overall NASDAQ exchange order imbalance and 
returns. 
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Hypothesis 2 
H0: Odd lot order imbalance and lagged returns will have the same negative relation displayed 
by overall market order imbalance and lagged returns. 
  
We expect the relation between odd lot order imbalance and contemporaneous returns 
to be similar to the relation between overall market order imbalance and contemporaneous 
returns.  Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) find a positive relation between overall 
market order imbalance and contemporaneous returns and conclude that order imbalances 
exert price pressure on current stock prices.  Given the size of odd lot trades coupled with the 
fact that odd lot trades account for only 7% of volume, we do not expect odd lot order 
imbalance to sufficiently add to or detract from the price pressure exerted by the overall order 
imbalance.  We, therefore, expect the relation between odd lot order imbalances and 
contemporaneous returns to be the same as the relation between the total market order 
imbalance and contemporaneous returns. 
Hypothesis 3 
H0: Odd lot order imbalance and contemporaneous returns will have the same positive relation 
displayed by overall market order imbalance and contemporaneous returns. 
  
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2004) conclude that a trading strategy based on the 
overall market and individual stock order imbalances can yield positive returns.  However, they 
further conclude that any positive return will be mitigated by transaction costs, because the 
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return is so small.  We expect a similar profitable trading strategy based on odd lot order 
imbalances.  
Hypothesis 4 
H0: The relation between individual stock odd lot order imbalance and future individual stock 
returns will be positive. 
  
Although the intraday relation between order imbalances and intraday returns, as well 
as the intraday pattern of order imbalances, is unknown, there is literature that implies what 
the intraday order imbalance pattern will look like and what the relation between intraday 
order imbalances and intraday returns will be.  Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) and 
Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) find that order imbalances are positively related to 
contemporaneous returns and McInish, Wood, and Ord (1985) documented a U-shaped 
intraday pattern to returns.  The intersection of these two studies leads to our prediction that 
order imbalances will also follow a U-shaped pattern since there is a positive relation between 
order imbalance and returns. 
Hypothesis 5 
H0: Intraday order imbalances and intraday odd lot order imbalances are predictors of intraday 
returns and follow a U-shaped pattern. 
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2.3 Data 
Our sample consists of all trades in the NASDAQ Historical TotalView ITCH (ITCH) 
database from July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2011.  The ITCH database includes all trades that execute 
on NASDAQ.  We filter our sample to include only stocks that trade at least five times a day and 
at least 1,000 shares every day for all 253 trading days of our sample.  For our analysis, we only 
use trades that execute during regular market hours, and only stocks listed on the NASDAQ 
exchange.  Trades executing for less than 100 shares are denoted as odd-lot trades.  Odd-lot 
trades that are submitted as a single odd-lot order and execute in full or are further divided into 
multiple odd lot-trades are denoted as pure odd-lot trades.  Odd-lot trades that are submitted 
as part of a 100+ share order that is subsequently divided into smaller executions, one of which 
is an odd-lot trade, are termed circumstantial odd-lot trades.  We use data from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for daily stock and market returns. 
Order imbalance (OIB) is calculated as the number of shares purchased minus the 
number of shares sold for a stock-day, divided by the total volume for that stock-day.  Odd-lot 
OIB is the number of shares purchased in odd-lot transactions minus the number of shares sold 
in odd-lot transactions for a stock-day, divided by the total odd-lot volume for that stock-day.  
Pure odd-lot OIB is the number of shares purchased in pure odd-lot transactions minus the 
number of shares sold in pure odd-lot transactions for a stock-day, divided by the total pure 
odd-lot volume for that stock-day.  Circumstantial odd-lot OIB is the number of odd-lot shares 
purchased in circumstantial odd-lot transactions minus the number of shares sold in 
circumstantial odd-lot transactions for a stock-day, divided by the total circumstantial odd-lot 
volume for that stock-day. 
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Trade imbalance (TIB) is calculated as the number of buy trades minus the number of 
sell trades for a stock-day, divided by the total number of trades for that stock-day.  Odd-lot TIB 
is the number of odd-lot buy trades minus the number of odd-lot sell trades for a stock-day, 
divided by the total number of odd-lot trades for that stock-day.  Pure odd-lot TIB is the 
number of pure odd-lot buy trades minus the number of pure odd-lot sell trades for a stock-
day, divided by the total number of pure odd-lot trades for that stock-day.  Circumstantial odd-
lot TIB is the number of circumstantial odd-lot buy trades minus the number of circumstantial 
odd-lot sell trades for a stock-day, divided by the total number of circumstantial odd-lot trades 
for that stock-day. 
 
2.4 Results 
Table 1 lists summary statistics for our sample.  The average daily raw return and daily 
excess return over the CRSP equally weighted index are reported.  Also reported are the 
average total volume and number of trades, odd-lot volume and number of trades, pure odd-
lot volume and number of trades, and circumstantial odd-lot volume and number of trades 
from July 1, 2010 through June 31, 2011, for all NASDAQ listed stock-days for a total of 351,379 
stock-days included in the sample.  Finally, Table 1 lists the average daily order imbalance and 
trade imbalance, odd-lot order imbalance and trade imbalance, pure odd-lot order imbalance 
and trade imbalance, and circumstantial odd-lot order imbalance and trade imbalance. 
 In our sample, the mean OIB and TIB is negative, suggesting there are more sells than 
buys by volume and number of trades, which is in contrast with Chordia, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam (2002) and Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004), who find mean order 
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imbalances to be positive in a sample of NYSE listed stock-days from 1988 to 1998.  We find 
odd-lot OIB and TIB and pure odd-lot OIB and TIB to be positive, and circumstantial OIB to be 
positive and circumstantial TIB to be negative, for the average stock-day day.  Mean odd-lot 
order imbalances that have different signs than overall market order imbalance lends cursory 
evidence to reject hypotheses 2-4, which stipulate that odd-lot order imbalances behave 
similarly to overall market order imbalances, with regards to their relation to returns.  However, 
we investigate these relations in a multivariate framework to discover their true nature. 
Table 2 lists autocorrelations between OIB and TIB for all transactions in Panel A, odd-lot 
transactions in Panel B, pure odd-lot transactions in Panel C, and circumstantial odd-lot 
transactions in Panel D.  There is significant autocorrelation between all OIB and TIB variables 
over lagged 1 through 4 trading days.  Although significant in all panels, the autocorrelation in 
our sample is weaker than the findings of Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) who find 
autocorrelations as high as 54% in their sample.  Our findings shown in Panel A where we use 
all trades in calculating OIB and TIB are reasonably comparable to Chorida, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam.  We find autocorrelations to be as high as 20% for OIB and 23% for TIB.  
Regardless, we include lagged order and trade imbalances in our regressions to control for the 
effect of past OIB and TIB on current OIB and TIB. 
Hypothesis 1 postulates that by including odd-lot transactions in the calculations of 
order imbalance, order imbalance will be better able to explain returns than if odd-lot 
transactions are not included.  We test Hypothesis 1 by comparing regressions using two 
subsamples of our data: one that excludes odd-lot transactions in the calculation of OIB and TIB 
(which is approximately analogous to the sample used by Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam 
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(2002) and Choridia and Subrahmanyam (2004)), and one that includes odd-lot transactions.  
Using both samples, we run fixed effects regressions of order imbalance on lagged returns, and 
fixed effects regressions of contemporaneous and future returns on order imbalance.  The 
results are reported in Table 3 and Table 4.  Table 3 shows the regression estimations using raw 
returns and Table 4 shows estimations using excess returns over the CRSP equally weighted 
index.   
Results of regressing contemporaneous order imbalances on lagged returns are 
reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 and 4; contemporaneous returns on order imbalances in 
Columns 3 and 4; and future returns on contemporaneous order imbalances in Columns 5 and 
6. 
Panel A of Tables 3 and 4 list regression coefficients using OIB and TIB that are 
calculated excluding odd-lot transactions while Panel B uses OIB and TIB calculated including 
odd-lot transactions.  By comparing the r-squareds of the regressions, we can assess which 
models better predict returns.  In both tables, the r-squares of the regressions that include odd-
lot transactions are uniformly higher than the r-squares of the respective regressions that do 
not include odd-lot transactions.  The higher r-square of regressions including odd-lot data 
supports Hypothesis 1 by showing that models that include odd-lot transactions are better able 
to explain the relation between returns and order imbalance. 
For the remainder of the study, we report only fixed effects regression results and 
excess returns using the CRSP equally weighted index.  Not reported are results using OLS 
regressions and results using the CRSP value weighted index, as results are similar to those 
reported.  
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Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) find that there is a positive relation between 
contemporaneous returns and order imbalances, surmising that there are positive (negative) 
price pressures put on equity prices during the course of the trading day when there are more 
buys (sells) than sells (buys).  The results in Tables 3 and 4 support this finding by showing a 
positive regression coefficient for OIB and TIB in columns 3 and 4.  In our sample, as order 
imbalance increases, so do contemporaneous raw and excess returns, as expected. 
However, our results are inconsistent with the findings of Chordia, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam (2002), who find a negative relation between lagged returns and 
contemporaneous order imbalances, and also with Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004), who 
find a slightly positive relation between future returns and contemporaneous order imbalances.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Tables 3 and 4 show the estimates from the regression of OIB and TIB on 
lagged returns, controlling for past order imbalances.  In both panels of tables 3 and 4, the 
regression coefficient for lagged returns is positive, suggesting that the market is not acting 
contrarianly, as Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) concluded.  Rather, in our sample, 
traders are purchasing (selling) equities on days following positive (negative) returns. 
Columns 5 and 6 of Tables 3 and 4 report the estimates from fixed effects regressions of 
future daily stock returns on contemporaneous order imbalance.  The regression coefficient for 
OIB and TIB is uniformly negative, which is the opposite of the findings of Chordia and 
Subrahmanyam (2004) who find a slightly positive coefficient.  However, since both this study 
and Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) find a significant relation between order imbalance and 
future returns, both conclude that a profitable trading strategy could be implemented in a 
frictionless environment.  In our sample, a trader could short stocks that have high levels of 
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order imbalance on the previous day and expect a positive raw and abnormal return.  However, 
as Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) also conclude, the profits from any such trading strategy 
are far too small to overcome trading costs that would be associated with its implementation. 
We test Hypothesis 2, which asserts odd-lot order imbalances have a negative relation 
with lagged returns, by regressing daily odd-lot order imbalances, pure order imbalances, and 
circumstantial odd-lot order imbalances on lagged daily returns and report the results in Table 
5.  Panel A lists the results of fixed effects regressions with odd-lot OIB and TIB as the 
dependent variables and lagged raw returns as the independent variable of interest, with 
lagged OIB and lagged TIB as control variables.  Panel B uses excess returns as the independent 
variable of interest.  In both panels, Columns 1-3 show estimates using odd-lot, pure odd-lot, 
and circumstantial odd-lot OIBs as the dependent variables, and Columns 4-6 use odd-lot, pure 
odd-lot, and circumstantial odd-lot TIBs as the dependent variables. 
 The results in Panel A contradict Hypothesis 2, which asserts that odd-lot order 
imbalances will have a negative relation with lagged returns.  In each regression, lagged returns 
have a positive relation with odd-lot order imbalances.  We conclude that odd-lot traders are 
not contrarian and are net purchasers of equities on days following positive returns, and net 
sellers of equities on days following negative returns.  As with overall market order imbalance 
results reported in Tables 3 and 4, these results are inconsistent with the results of Chordia, 
Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) who conclude market participants trade contrarianly with 
regards to lagged daily stock returns. 
We explore the relation between excess returns and odd-lot order imbalances,  and 
show that some odd-lot traders behave contrarianly with regards to excess returns (see Panel 
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B).  In aggregate, lagged excess returns have either a non-significant relation with odd-lot order 
imbalances when measured by OIB, or a slightly negative relation with odd-lot order 
imbalances when measured by TIB.  The findings in Panel B suggest pure odd-lot traders do not 
behave contrarianly and excess returns have a positive relation to pure odd-lot order 
imbalances.   
However, circumstantial odd-lot traders are net sellers of stocks on days after negative 
returns and net buyers of stocks on days following positive returns, as shown by negative 
regression coefficients for lagged excess returns in Columns 3 and 6.  This result is 
counterintuitive, as we expect the coefficients of circumstantial odd-lot trades to be similar to 
100+ share trades since circumstantial odd-lot trades are submitted as 100+ orders and with 
the same information as 100+ share orders.  However, Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4, Panel A 
show that 100+ share order imbalance has a negative relation with lagged excess returns, yet 
Table 5 shows circumstantial odd-lot order imbalance has a positive relation with excess 
returns. 
Hypothesis 3 asserts that odd-lot order imbalances will have the same positive relation 
to contemporaneous returns as total market order imbalances have.  This relation is 
documented by Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) and Chordia and Subrahmanyam 
(2004) using a sample of NYSE stocks trades from 1988 to 1998.  Table 6 lends evidence that 
confirms Hypothesis 3.  Panel A of Table 6 reports the results of fixed effects regressions with 
contemporaneous daily raw returns as the dependent variable and odd-lot order imbalances as 
the independent variable, controlling for lagged order imbalances.  Columns 1 and 4 report use 
odd-lot OIB and TIB, Columns 2 and 5 report use pure odd-lot OIB and TIB, and Column 4 and 6 
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use circumstantial odd-lot OIB and TIB. In all regressions, the odd-lot order imbalance variable 
of interest is positive.  This result suggests that odd-lot traders behave similarly to all traders in 
aggregate, and are net buyers (sellers) on days with positive (negative) returns.  We conclude 
that the price pressures observed by Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2004) still exist and that 
order imbalances are driving contemporaneous returns. 
Panel B of Table 6 also lists the coefficients of fixed effects regressions with odd-lot 
order imbalances as the independent variables, but with excess returns as the dependent 
variable.  The results are similar to the results in Panel A with all odd-lot OIB and TIB regression 
coefficients being positive. 
Hypothesis 4 postulates that odd-lot order imbalances have a positive relation to future 
returns.  We find strong evidence to reject this hypothesis in Table 7, which reports estimates 
from regressing future daily returns on contemporaneous odd-lot order imbalances.  In both 
Panel A and Panel B, coefficients for odd-lot, pure odd-lot, and circumstantial odd-lot order 
imbalances are consistently negative (Panel A uses raw returns as the dependent variable and 
Panel B uses excess returns).  Again, we agree with Chorida, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2004) 
that a profitable trading strategy can be implemented in a frictionless environment (albeit their 
strategy involves buying stocks with a high prior day’s OIB, while our strategy involves shorting), 
any profits generated would likely be negated by transactions costs.  For example, if odd-lot 
order imbalance doubled relative to odd-lot volume (i.e. a 1.00 or 100% increase in order 
imbalance), one could expect to generate a 0.19% raw return (or 0.16% excess return) on 
average by shorting, which is certainly smaller than the trading costs of implementing the 
strategy. 
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We investigate the intraday patterns of odd-lot order imbalance to test Hypothesis 5, 
which asserts odd-lot order imbalances have a U-shaped pattern over minutes 2 through 381 of 
the trading day.  We omit minutes 1 and minutes 382-391 to mitigate the influence of the 
opening and closing cross.  Results from analyses that include the full trading day (not reported) 
are similar.  Figure 1 is a graph of average total odd-lot volume and number of trades (Panel A) 
odd-lot, pure odd-lot, and circumstantial odd-lot trading by volume (in Panel B) and by number 
of trades (in Panel C).  Panel A, which we include for comparison to odd-lot results, shows the 
expected U-shaped pattern for total market volume and number of trades.  Both Panels B and C 
show a clear U-shaped pattern for all odd-lot trades, which supports Hypothesis 5.  We confirm 
the U-shaped pattern by regressing odd-lot, pure odd-lot, and circumstantial odd-lot buy and 
sell volume and number of trades on 15 minute period of the trading day and report the results 
in the Appendix. 
Figure 2 graphs average odd-lot OIB and TIB over minutes 2-391 of the trading day, with 
Panel A graphing odd-lot OIB and TIB, Panel B graphing pure odd-lot OIB and TIB, and Panel C 
graphing circumstantial odd-lot OIB and TIB.  We omit minute 1 to mitigate the influence of the 
opening cross.  Results from analyses which include the full trading day (not reported) are 
similar.  Figure 2 lends evidence to reject Hypothesis 5 by showing no clear pattern, thus no U-
shaped pattern, to intraday odd-lot order imbalances.  We confirm this lack of pattern by 
regressing odd-lot, pure odd-lot, and circumstantial odd-lot OIB and TIB on 15 minute intervals 
of the trading day in the Appendix. 
 
 
 78 
   
2.5 Conclusion 
This study investigates total market, odd-lot, pure odd-lot, and circumstantial odd-lot 
order imbalances, and arrives at several important conclusions.  First, we show that odd-lot 
transactions add to capital market studies, as including odd-lot transactions increases the 
accuracy and efficiency of models, relative to those that exclude odd-lot transactions.  To date 
the vast majority of capital market studies exclude odd-lot trades.  Second, we show that odd-
lot traders behave similarly to 100+ share traders with regards to buying and selling of stock-
days in relation to prior, current, and future daily returns, although the nature of the relation 
between order imbalances and lagged and future returns needs to be further investigated to 
fully explain the nature of the relationship.  Finally, we show that odd-lot buying and selling 
follows a similar intraday pattern to total market volume, but there is no discernible pattern of 
order imbalance on an intraday level.
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics 
Variable       
Raw Return  0.0013     
   (0.0283)     
Excess Return  0.0002     
   (0.0257)     
        
   TOTAL  BUY  SELL 
Volume All  283,127  141,227  141,900 
   (1,044,082)  (521,081)  (529,598) 
 Odd  13,500  6,750  6,750 
   (32,843)  (16,500)  (16,620) 
 Pure  5,269  2,637  2,632 
   (14,231)  (7,170)  (7,231) 
 Circum  8,231  4,114  4,118 
   (19,166)  (9,698)  (9,745) 
        
Trades All  1,688  842  846 
   (3,893)  (1,951)  (1,956) 
 Odd  329  164  165 
   (820)  (412)  (417) 
 Pure  151  75  76 
   (435)  (220)  (222) 
 Circum  178  89  89 
   (404)  (205)  (207) 
        
   OIB  TIB   
Order Imbalance All  -0.0092  -0.0064   
   (0.2536)  (0.2222)   
 Odd  0.0020  0.0080   
   (0.3326)  (0.3373)   
 Pure  0.0086  0.0151   
   (0.3195)  (0.3142)   
 Circum  -0.0018  0.0022   
   (0.4599)  (0.4672)   
N = 351,379        
Table 1 lists the daily mean raw and excess return, total market, odd-lot, pure odd-lot, and 
circumstantial odd-lot total volume and number of trades, buy volume and number of trades, 
sell volume and number of trades, and order imbalance calculated as a percentage of volume 
(OIB) and as a percentage of trades (TIB) from all trades executed on NASDAQ for all NASDAQ 
listed stocks occurring from July 2010 through June 2011.  Standard deviations are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Table 2.  Order Imbalance Autocorrelations 
Panel A: All Trades 
Variables OIBt OIBt-1 OIBt-2 OIBt-3 OIBt-4 
OIBt 1.0000     
       
       
OIBt-1 0.1997*** 1.0000    
 (0.000)     
           
OIBt-2 0.1094*** 0.1994*** 1.0000   
 (0.000) (0.000)     
           
OIBt-3 0.0777*** 0.1095*** 0.1995*** 1.0000  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
          
OIBt-4 0.0669*** 0.0776*** 0.1094*** 0.1992*** 1.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
      
 TIBt TIBt-1 TIBt-2 TIBt-3 TIBt-4 
TIBt 1.0000     
       
           
TIBt-1 0.2270*** 1.0000    
 (0.000)     
           
TIBt-2 0.1301*** 0.2267*** 1.0000   
 (0.000) (0.000)    
           
TIBt-3 0.0840*** 0.1304*** 0.2268*** 1.0000  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
           
TIBt-4 0.0691*** 0.0840*** 0.1303*** 0.2266*** 1.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
 
Panel B: Odd-lot Trades 
Variables OIBt OIBt-1 OIBt-2 OIBt-3 OIBt-4 
OIBt 1.0000     
       
          
OIBt-1 0.1421*** 1.0000    
 (0.000)      
          
OIBt-2 0.0906*** 0.1421*** 1.0000   
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 (0.000) (0.000)     
          
OIBt-3 0.0613*** 0.0910*** 0.1421*** 1.0000  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
          
OIBt-4 0.0491*** 0.0612*** 0.0911*** 0.1419*** 1.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
      
 TIBt TIBt-1 TIBt-2 TIBt-3 TIBt-4 
TIBt 1.0000     
       
          
TIBt-1 0.1789*** 1.0000    
 (0.000)      
          
TIBt-2 0.1164*** 0.1790*** 1.0000   
 (0.000) (0.000)     
          
TIBt-3 0.0796*** 0.1170*** 0.1790*** 1.0000  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
          
TIBt-4 0.0658*** 0.0796*** 0.1170*** 0.1788*** 1.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
 
Panel C: Pure Odd-lot Trades 
Variables OIBt OIBt-1 OIBt-2 OIBt-3 OIBt-4 
OIBt 1.0000     
      
      
OIBt-1 0.0808*** 1.0000    
 (0.000)     
      
OIBt-2 0.0507*** 0.0810*** 1.0000   
 (0.000) (0.000)    
      
OIBt-3 0.0362*** 0.0508*** 0.0808*** 1.0000  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
      
OIBt-4 0.0300*** 0.0363*** 0.0509*** 0.0807*** 1.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
      
 TIBt TIBt-1 TIBt-2 TIBt-3 TIBt-4 
TIBt 1.0000     
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TIBt-1 0.1351*** 1.0000    
 (0.000)     
      
TIBt-2 0.0928*** 0.1353*** 1.0000   
 (0.000) (0.000)    
      
TIBt-3 0.0673*** 0.0929*** 0.1350*** 1.0000  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
      
TIBt-4 0.0554*** 0.0674*** 0.0930*** 0.1348*** 1.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
 
Panel D: Circumstantial Odd-lot Trades 
Variables OIBt OIBt-1 OIBt-2 OIBt-3 OIBt-4 
OIBt 1.0000     
       
           
OIBt-1 0.1273*** 1.0000    
 (0.000)      
           
OIBt-2 0.0836*** 0.1271*** 1.0000   
 (0.000) (0.000)     
           
OIBt-3 0.0547*** 0.0841*** 0.1272*** 1.0000  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
           
OIBt-4 0.0456*** 0.0546*** 0.0840*** 0.1270*** 1.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
      
 TIBt TIBt-1 TIBt-2 TIBt-3 TIBt-4 
TIBt 1.0000     
       
           
TIBt-1 0.1480*** 1.0000    
 (0.000)      
           
TIBt-2 0.0968*** 0.1479*** 1.0000   
 (0.000) (0.000)     
           
TIBt-3 0.0632*** 0.0976*** 0.1481*** 1.0000  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
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TIBt-4 0.0538*** 0.0631*** 0.0974*** 0.1478*** 1.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
Table 2 lists autocorrelations for stock-day order imbalance calculated as percentage of volume 
(OIB) and as a percentage of trades (TIB) lagged 1 to 4 trading days, for all, odd-lot, pure odd-
lot, and circumstantial odd-lot transactions executed on NASDAQ for all NASDAQ listed stocks 
occurring from July 2010 through June 2011.  Panel A lists autocorrelations for all trades, Panel 
B lists autocorrelations for odd-lot trades, Panel C lists autocorrelations for pure odd-lot trades, 
and Panel D lists autocorrelations for circumstantial odd-lot trades.  P-values are in reported in 
parentheses.  ***, ** & * denote significance at the 1%, 5% & 10% levels, respectively. 
 82 
 
Table 3.  Order Imbalance and Raw Returns 
Panel A: Exclusive of Odd-lot Trades 
Variable OIBt TIBt  Return i, t  Return i, t+1 
Intercept -0.0076*** -0.0078***  0.0015*** 0.0015***  0.0013*** 0.0013*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
         
Return i, t-1 0.1663*** 0.1454***       
 (0.000) (0.000)       
         
OIBt    0.0394***   -0.0006***  
    (0.000)   (0.001)  
         
OIBt-1 0.1582***   -0.0070***   -0.0010***  
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
         
OIBt-2 0.0503***   -0.0029***   -0.0005**  
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.011)  
         
OIBt-3 0.0285***   -0.0016***   -0.0013***  
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
         
OIBt-4 0.0270***   -0.0023***   0.0003*  
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.090)  
         
TIBt     0.0362***   -0.0015*** 
     (0.000)   (0.000) 
         
TIBt-1  0.1837***   -0.0082***   -0.0006*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.005) 
         
TIBt-2  0.0581***   -0.0026***   -0.0000 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.886) 
         
TIBt-3  0.0320***   -0.0012***   -0.0015*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
         
TIBt-4  0.0293***   -0.0024***   0.0007*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.003) 
         
R2 0.0364 0.0489  0.1254 0.0779  0.0004 0.0004 
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Panel B: Inclusive of Odd-lot Trades 
Variable OIBt TIBt  Return i, t  Return i, t+1 
Intercept -0.0070*** -0.0047***  0.0015*** 0.0014***  0.0013*** 0.0013*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
         
Return i, t-1 0.1554*** 0.1422***       
 (0.000) (0.000)       
         
OIBt    0.0424***   -0.0009***  
    (0.000)   (0.000)  
         
OIBt-1 0.1616***   -0.0079***   -0.0011***  
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
         
OIBt-2 0.0525***   -0.0032***   -0.0007***  
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
         
OIBt-3 0.0281***   -0.0019***   -0.0015***  
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
         
OIBt-4 0.0271***   -0.0026***   0.0004*  
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.070)  
         
TIBt     0.0432***   -0.0022*** 
     (0.000)   (0.000) 
         
TIBt-1  0.1894***   -0.0106***   -0.0013*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
         
TIBt-2  0.0668***   -0.0039***   -0.0013*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
         
TIBt-3  0.0273***   -0.0026***   -0.0022*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
         
TIBt-4  0.0279***   -0.0034***   0.0004* 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.095) 
         
R2 0.0381 0.0531  0.1366 0.1086  0.0005 0.0011 
 
Table 3 lists the results of fixed effects regressions with contemporaneous stock-day odd-lot 
order imbalance calculated as a percentage of volume (OIB) and as a percentage of trades (TIB), 
contemporaneous daily stock returns, and future daily stock returns as the dependent variables 
from trades executed on NASDAQ for all NASDAQ listed stocks occurring from July 2010 
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through June 2011.  The independent variables are lagged daily stock returns, 
contemporaneous OIB and TIB, and OIB and TIB lagged 1 to 4 days.  Panel A lists results from 
regressions with OIB and TIB calculated excluding odd-lot transactions, and Panel B lists results 
from regressions with OIB and TIB calculated including odd-lot transactions.  P-values are in 
reported in parentheses.  ***, ** & * denote significance at the 1%, 5% & 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 4.  Order Imbalance and Excess Returns 
Panel A: Exclusive of Odd-lot Trades 
Variable OIBt TIBt  Return i, t  Return i, t+1 
Intercept -0.0075*** -0.0077***  0.0004*** 0.0004***  0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
         
Return i, t-1 0.2091*** 0.2078***       
 (0.000) (0.000)       
         
OIBt    0.0319***   -0.0003*  
    (0.000)   (0.064)  
         
OIBt-1 0.1581***   -0.0055***   -0.0009***  
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
         
OIBt-2 0.0503***   -0.0024***   -0.0004**  
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.027)  
         
OIBt-3 0.0285***   -0.0013***   -0.0011***  
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
         
OIBt-4 0.0270***   -0.0019***   0.0003*  
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.092)  
         
TIBt     0.0296***   -0.0011*** 
     (0.000)   (0.000) 
         
TIBt-1  0.1828***   -0.0066***   -0.0007*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
         
TIBt-2  0.0583***   -0.0024***   -0.0001 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.703) 
         
TIBt-3  0.0321***   -0.0010***   -0.0012*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
         
TIBt-4  0.0293***   -0.0020***   0.0005*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.008) 
         
R2 0.0365 0.0492  0.1001 0.0632  0.0003 0.0003 
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Panel B: Inclusive of Odd-lot Trades 
Variable OIBt TIBt  Return i, t  Return i, t+1 
Intercept -0.0069*** -0.0045***  0.0004*** 0.0003***  0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
         
Return i, t-1 0.1868*** 0.1593***       
 (0.000) (0.000)       
         
OIBt    0.0338***   -0.0005***  
    (0.000)   (0.003)  
         
OIBt-1 0.1619***   -0.0061***   -0.0009***  
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
         
OIBt-2 0.0524***   -0.0026***   -0.0005***  
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.006)  
         
OIBt-3 0.0281***   -0.0014***   -0.0012***  
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
         
OIBt-4 0.0270***   -0.0020***   0.0003*  
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.051)  
         
TIBt     0.0324***   -0.0019*** 
     (0.000)   (0.000) 
         
TIBt-1  0.1904***   -0.0081***   -0.0009*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
         
TIBt-2  0.0666***   -0.0029***   -0.0005** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.011) 
         
TIBt-3  0.0272***   -0.0014***   -0.0014*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
         
TIBt-4  0.0277***   -0.0021***   0.0007*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001) 
         
R2 0.0381 0.0532  0.1055 0.0739  0.0003 0.0006 
Table 4 lists the results of fixed effects regressions with contemporaneous stock-day odd-lot 
order imbalance calculated as a percentage of volume (OIB) and as a percentage of trades (TIB), 
contemporaneous daily stock excess returns over the CRSP equally weighted index, and future 
daily stock excess returns as the dependent variables from trades executed on NASDAQ for all 
NASDAQ listed stocks occurring from July 2010 through June 2011.  The independent variables 
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are lagged daily stock excess returns, contemporaneous OIB and TIB, and OIB and TIB lagged 1 
to 4 days.  Panel A lists results from regressions with OIB and TIB calculated excluding odd-lot 
transactions, and Panel B lists results from regressions with OIB and TIB calculated including 
odd-lot transactions.  P-values are in reported in parentheses.  ***, ** & * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5% & 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5.  Odd-lot Order Imbalance on Lagged Returns 
Panel A: Raw Returns 
Variable Odd OIBt Pure OIBt Circ OIBt Odd TIBt Pure TIBt Circ TIBt 
Intercept 0.0082*** 0.0116*** 0.0063*** 0.0147*** 0.0192*** 0.0109*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Return i, t-1 0.1792*** 0.1736*** 0.2023*** 0.1781*** 0.1945*** 0.1767*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
OIBt 0.6580*** 0.3408*** 0.8918***    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
       
OIBt-1 0.0187*** 0.0116*** 0.0185***    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
       
OIBt-2 0.0190*** 0.0093*** 0.0260***    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
       
OIBt-3 0.0077*** 0.0015 0.0098***    
 (0.000) (0.483) (0.001)    
       
OIBt-4 0.0029 -0.0009 0.0052*    
 (0.135) (0.677) (0.062)    
       
TIBt    1.0579*** 0.6561*** 1.3715*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
TIBt-1    -0.0042** 0.0040* -0.0135*** 
    (0.039) (0.086) (0.000) 
       
TIBt-2    0.0222*** 0.0213*** 0.0244*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
TIBt-3    0.0107*** 0.0112*** 0.0055* 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.058) 
       
TIBt-4    0.0006 0.0001 0.0035 
    (0.751) (0.980) (0.214) 
       
R2 0.2541 0.0738 0.2389 0.4865 0.2170 0.4192 
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Panel B: Excess Returns 
Variable Odd OIBt Pure OIBt Circ OIBt Odd TIBt Pure TIBt Circ TIBt 
Intercept 0.0085*** 0.0118*** 0.0067*** 0.0150*** 0.0194*** 0.0111*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Return i, t-1 0.0174 0.1710*** -0.0595** -0.0279* 0.0974*** -0.0981*** 
 (0.382) (0.000) (0.033) (0.090) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
OIBt 0.6583*** 0.3408*** 0.8923***    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
       
OIBt-1 0.0256*** 0.0132*** 0.0290***    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
       
OIBt-2 0.0177*** 0.0090*** 0.0239***    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
       
OIBt-3 0.0072*** 0.0014 0.0089***    
 (0.000) (0.518) (0.002)    
       
OIBt-4 0.0025 -0.0010 0.0046    
 (0.198) (0.637) (0.100)    
       
TIBt    1.0584*** 0.6563*** 1.3721*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
TIBt-1    0.0043** 0.0092*** -0.0028 
    (0.033) (0.000) (0.352) 
       
TIBt-2    0.0201*** 0.0201*** 0.0216*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
TIBt-3    0.0099*** 0.0106*** 0.0044 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.127) 
       
TIBt-4    -0.0001 -0.0004 0.0027 
    (0.975) (0.848) (0.338) 
       
R2 0.2539 0.0738 0.2388 0.4863 0.2168 0.4191 
Table 5 lists the results of fixed effects regressions with contemporaneous stock-day odd-lot, 
pure odd-lot, and circumstantial odd-lot order imbalance calculated as a percentage of volume 
(OIB) and as percentage of trades (TIB) as the dependent variables from trades executed on 
NASDAQ for all NASDAQ listed stocks occurring from July 2010 through June 2011.  The 
independent variables are lagged daily stock returns, contemporaneous OIB and TIB, and OIB 
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and TIB lagged 1 to 4 days.  Panel A lists the results from regressions using daily raw stock 
returns, and Panel B lists the results from regressions using daily stock excess returns over the 
CRSP equally weighted index.  P-values are in reported in parentheses.  ***, ** & * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% & 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6.  Contemporaneous Returns on Order Imbalance 
Panel A: Raw Returns 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.0014*** 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0014*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Odd OIBt 0.0099***         
 (0.000)      
Pure OIBt  0.0052***     
  (0.000)     
Circ OIBt   0.0065***    
   (0.000)    
Odd TIBt    0.0107***   
    (0.000)   
Pure TIBt     0.0053***  
     (0.000)  
Circ TIBt      0.0065*** 
      (0.000) 
OIBt 0.0361*** 0.0410*** 0.0375***    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
OIBt-1 -0.0082*** -0.0080*** -0.0082***    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
OIBt-2 -0.0034*** -0.0033*** -0.0034***    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
OIBt-3 -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0021***    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
OIBt-4 -0.0026*** -0.0026*** -0.0026***    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
TIBt    0.0321*** 0.0401*** 0.0349*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TIBt-1    -0.0106*** -0.0107*** -0.0106*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TIBt-2    -0.0041*** -0.0040*** -0.0041*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TIBt-3    -0.0027*** -0.0027*** -0.0027*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TIBt-4    -0.0034*** -0.0034*** -0.0034*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R2 0.1470 0.1403 0.1467 0.1172 0.1119 0.1164 
 
Panel B: Excess Returns 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Odd OIBt 0.0038***      
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 (0.000)      
Pure OIBt  0.0039***     
  (0.000)     
Circ OIBt   0.0017***    
   (0.000)    
Odd TIBt    0.0030***   
    (0.000)   
Pure TIBt     0.0031***  
     (0.000)  
Circ TIBt      0.0011*** 
      (0.000) 
OIBt 0.0314*** 0.0327*** 0.0329***    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
OIBt-1 -0.0062*** -0.0062*** -0.0062***    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
OIBt-2 -0.0027*** -0.0027*** -0.0027***    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
OIBt-3 -0.0015*** -0.0014*** -0.0015***    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
OIBt-4 -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020***    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
TIBt    0.0292*** 0.0305*** 0.0312*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TIBt-1    -0.0081*** -0.0082*** -0.0081*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TIBt-2    -0.0030*** -0.0030*** -0.0030*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TIBt-3    -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TIBt-4    -0.0021*** -0.0021*** -0.0021*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R2 0.1076 0.1081 0.1073 0.0749 0.0752 0.0746 
Table 6 lists the results of fixed effects regressions with contemporaneous daily stock returns as 
the dependent variable and contemporaneous stock-day odd-lot, pure odd-lot, and 
circumstantial odd-lot order imbalance calculated as a percentage of volume (OIB) and as 
percentage of trades (TIB), contemporaneous OIB and TIB, and OIB and TIB lagged 1 to 4 days 
as the independent variables from trades executed on NASDAQ for all NASDAQ listed stocks 
occurring from July 2010 through June 2011.  Panel A lists the results from regressions using 
daily raw stock returns, and Panel B lists the results from regressions using daily stock excess 
returns over the CRSP equally weighted index.  P-values are in reported in parentheses.  ***, ** 
& * denote significance at the 1%, 5% & 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7.  Future Returns on Order Imbalance 
Panel A: Raw Returns 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Odd OIBt -0.0019***      
 (0.000)      
Pure OIBt  -0.0007***     
  (0.000)     
Circ OIBt   -0.0014***    
   (0.000)    
Odd TIBt    -0.0016***   
    (0.000)   
Pure TIBt     -0.0008***  
     (0.000)  
Circ TIBt      -0.0010*** 
      (0.000) 
OIBt 0.0004* -0.0006*** 0.0004    
 (0.070) (0.006) (0.115)    
OIBt-1 -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011***    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
OIBt-2 -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007***    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
OIBt-3 -0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0015***    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
OIBt-4 0.0004* 0.0003* 0.0004**    
 (0.059) (0.086) (0.024)    
TIBt    -0.0005* -0.0017*** -0.0009*** 
    (0.093) (0.000) (0.003) 
TIBt-1    -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TIBt-2    -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TIBt-3    -0.0022*** -0.0021*** -0.0022*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TIBt-4    0.0004 0.0003 0.0004* 
    (0.100) (0.153) (0.069) 
R2 0.0008 0.0005 0.0009 0.0013 0.0011 0.0013 
 
Panel B: Excess Returns 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Odd OIBt -0.0016***      
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 (0.000)      
Pure OIBt  -0.0006***     
  (0.000)     
Circ OIBt   -0.0012***    
   (0.000)    
Odd TIBt    -0.0013***   
    (0.000)   
Pure TIBt     -0.0005***  
     (0.001)  
Circ TIBt      -0.0009*** 
      (0.000) 
OIBt 0.0005*** -0.0003 0.0005**    
 (0.007) (0.135) (0.011)    
OIBt-1 -0.0009*** -0.0010*** -0.0009***    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
OIBt-2 -0.0005*** -0.0005** -0.0005**    
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.012)    
OIBt-3 -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0012***    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
OIBt-4 0.0004** 0.0003* 0.0004**    
 (0.045) (0.063) (0.018)    
TIBt    -0.0005* -0.0015*** -0.0007*** 
    (0.079) (0.000) (0.010) 
TIBt-1    -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TIBt-2    -0.0005** -0.0005** -0.0005** 
    (0.015) (0.019) (0.018) 
TIBt-3    -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TIBt-4    0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 
    (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
R2 0.0007 0.0004 0.0007 0.0008 0.0006 0.0008 
Table 7 lists the results of fixed effects regressions with future daily stock returns as the 
dependent variable and contemporaneous stock-day odd-lot, pure odd-lot, and circumstantial 
odd-lot order imbalance calculated as a percentage of volume (OIB) and as percentage of 
trades (TIB), contemporaneous OIB and TIB, and OIB and TIB lagged 1 to 4 days as the 
independent variables from trades executed on NASDAQ for all NASDAQ listed stocks occurring 
from July 2010 through June 2011.  Panel A lists the results from regressions using daily raw 
stock returns, and Panel B lists the results from regressions using daily stock excess returns over 
the CRSP equally weighted index.  P-values are in reported in parentheses.  ***, ** & * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% & 10% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1.  Intraday Buys and Sells 
Panel A: Total Market Buys / Sells by Volume and Number of Trades 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Odd-lot Buy/Sell Volume 
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Panel C: Odd-lot Buy/Sell Number of Trades 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 graphs buy and sell volume and number of trades over the minute of the trading day for trades executed on NASDAQ 
for all NASDAQ listed stocks occurring from July 2010 through June 2011.  Panel A graphs total buy and sell volume and number 
of trades, Panel B graphs odd-lot, pure odd-lot, and circumstantial odd-lot volume, and Panel C graphs odd-lot, pure odd-lot, 
and circumstantial odd-lot number of trades. 
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Figure 2. Intraday Odd-lot Order Imbalances 
Panel A: Odd-lot OIB and TIB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Pure Odd-lot OIB and TIB 
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Panel C. Circumstantial Odd-lot OIB and TIB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 graphs odd-lot order imbalance calculated as a percentage of volume (OIB) and percentage of trades (TIB) over the 
minute of the trading day for trades executed on NASDAQ for all NASDAQ listed stocks occurring from July 2010 through June 
2011.  Panel A graphs odd-lot OIB and TIB, Panel B graphs pure odd-lot OIB and TIB, and Panel C graphs circumstantial odd-lot 
OIB and TIB. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. 
 Odd Pure Circumstantial 
 Volume #Trades Volume #Trades Volume #Trades 
 Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell 
Int 36,502*** 37,224*** 870*** 890*** 15,927*** 16,035*** 434*** 439*** 20,575*** 21,190*** 436*** 451*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
per1 45,435*** 47,725*** 1,036*** 1,083*** 20,910*** 21,167*** 520*** 526*** 24,525*** 26,558*** 516*** 557*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
per2 40,273*** 40,010*** 926*** 908*** 17,408*** 16,485*** 456*** 420*** 22,864*** 23,525*** 471*** 488*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
per3 45,947*** 44,681*** 1,072*** 1,025*** 19,949*** 19,064*** 527*** 493*** 25,997*** 25,617*** 545*** 533*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
per4 32,468*** 29,660*** 768*** 684*** 14,230*** 12,971*** 385*** 340*** 18,238*** 16,689*** 383** 344** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.017) 
per5 30,190*** 28,887*** 721*** 688*** 13,365*** 12,611*** 372*** 348*** 16,824*** 16,275*** 349** 339** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.008) (0.023) (0.019) 
per6 24,084** 23,150** 577** 550** 10,834*** 10,088*** 302*** 277*** 13,250** 13,062** 275* 273* 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.040) (0.032) (0.072) (0.059) 
per7 22,436** 23,578*** 536** 567** 10,069*** 9,971*** 280*** 280*** 12,366* 13,607** 256* 287** 
 (0.019) (0.010) (0.025) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.056) (0.026) (0.095) (0.047) 
per8 17,362* 16,781* 412* 398* 7,778** 7,248** 215** 199** 9,584 9,533 197 199 
 (0.069) (0.065) (0.084) (0.080) (0.013) (0.018) (0.014) (0.018) (0.138) (0.117) (0.196) (0.167) 
per9 13,567 13,028 325 317 6,100* 5,647* 172** 159* 7,468 7,381 153 158 
 (0.155) (0.152) (0.173) (0.162) (0.051) (0.064) (0.048) (0.058) (0.247) (0.225) (0.316) (0.273) 
per10 9,300 8,982 229 227 4,168 3,819 122 114 5,132 5,164 107 113 
 (0.329) (0.323) (0.336) (0.318) (0.182) (0.210) (0.161) (0.176) (0.426) (0.396) (0.481) (0.433) 
per11 6,589 6,332 163 159 2,878 2,692 85 80 3,711 3,639 78 79 
 (0.489) (0.486) (0.493) (0.484) (0.356) (0.377) (0.328) (0.340) (0.565) (0.549) (0.608) (0.584) 
per12 3,211 3,502 87 96 1,393 1,388 45 44 1,818 2,114 42 52 
 (0.736) (0.700) (0.714) (0.672) (0.655) (0.649) (0.601) (0.601) (0.778) (0.728) (0.783) (0.717) 
per13 2,513 1,918 62 48 974 748 29 24 1,539 1,170 33 25 
 (0.792) (0.833) (0.794) (0.832) (0.755) (0.806) (0.734) (0.778) (0.811) (0.847) (0.830) (0.865) 
per15 1,895 1,079 41 20 586 429 15 10 1,309 650 26 10 
 (0.842) (0.906) (0.863) (0.931) (0.851) (0.888) (0.859) (0.909) (0.839) (0.915) (0.865) (0.944) 
per16 1,305 933 36 18 468 348 16 8 847 595 21 10 
 (0.891) (0.918) (0.878) (0.936) (0.881) (0.909) (0.856) (0.922) (0.895) (0.922) (0.892) (0.944) 
per17 2,170 2,019 52 46 777 775 25 22 1,420 1,287 28 24 
 (0.820) (0.824) (0.826) (0.839) (0.803) (0.799) (0.777) (0.794) (0.826) (0.832) (0.855) (0.867) 
per18 3,162 2,017 75 44 1,240 883 34 22 1,937 1,156 41 22 
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 (0.740) (0.824) (0.755) (0.845) (0.691) (0.772) (0.695) (0.792) (0.764) (0.849) (0.790) (0.877) 
per19 10,708 9,930 250 228 4,394 4,110 114 104 6,347 5,852 136 124 
 (0.261) (0.275) (0.295) (0.316) (0.159) (0.178) (0.188) (0.216) (0.325) (0.336) (0.375) (0.390) 
per20 10,412 9,830 239 220 4,484 4,120 113 101 5,975 5,744 125 119 
 (0.275) (0.280) (0.317) (0.332) (0.151) (0.177) (0.192) (0.230) (0.354) (0.345) (0.411) (0.407) 
per21 14,500 11,810 338 265 5,474* 4,705 146* 118 9,061 7,135 192 147 
 (0.128) (0.194) (0.156) (0.243) (0.080) (0.123) (0.093) (0.161) (0.160) (0.241) (0.208) (0.307) 
per22 15,313 15,127* 351 341 5,978* 5,905* 156* 150* 9,363 9,253 195 191 
 (0.108) (0.097) (0.142) (0.133) (0.056) (0.053) (0.073) (0.074) (0.147) (0.129) (0.203) (0.185) 
per23 20,532** 21,004** 465* 473** 7,494** 7,614** 191** 192** 13,108** 13,427** 274* 281* 
 (0.032) (0.021) (0.052) (0.037) (0.017) (0.013) (0.028) (0.023) (0.043) (0.028) (0.073) (0.051) 
per24 29,774*** 29,028*** 683*** 667*** 11,015*** 10,909*** 285*** 284*** 18,828*** 18,209*** 398*** 384*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008) 
per25 51,254*** 48,408*** 1,158*** 1,088*** 18,395*** 17,884*** 463*** 451*** 32,924*** 30,600*** 695*** 637*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
per26 165,651*** 162,901*** 3,906*** 3,854*** 59,335*** 59,119*** 1,559*** 1,559*** 106,463*** 103,949*** 2,347*** 2,295*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R2 0.6110 0.6268 0.5797 0.5986 0.6645 0.6724 0.6348 0.6493 0.5816 0.6001 0.5441 0.5633 
Table A1 lists the results of OLS regressions with odd lot, pure odd lot, and circumstantial odd lot buy and sell volume and 
number of trades as the dependent variable and 15 minute period of the trading day as the dependent variables for trades 
executed on NASDAQ for all NASDAQ listed stocks occurring from July 2010 through June 2011.  P-values are in reported in 
parentheses.  ***, ** & * denote significance at the 1%, 5% & 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table A2. 
 Odd  Pure  Circumstantial 
 OIB TIB  OIB TIB  OIB TIB 
Int -0.0056 -0.0074  -0.0008 -0.0032  -0.0086 -0.0110 
 (0.283) (0.172)  (0.829) (0.430)  (0.192) (0.120) 
per1 -0.0106 -0.0077  -0.0018 0.0005  -0.0183* -0.0162 
 (0.157) (0.325)  (0.726) (0.926)  (0.054) (0.111) 
per2 0.0025 0.0067  0.0129** 0.0202***  -0.0059 -0.0065 
 (0.743) (0.388)  (0.013) (0.001)  (0.533) (0.523) 
per3 0.0085 0.0137*  0.0111** 0.0179***  0.0059 0.0092 
 (0.255) (0.079)  (0.032) (0.002)  (0.534) (0.364) 
per4 0.0207*** 0.0270***  0.0201*** 0.0281***  0.0204** 0.0253** 
 (0.006) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.031) (0.013) 
per5 0.0097 0.0113  0.0117** 0.0144**  0.0075 0.0076 
 (0.193) (0.147)  (0.024) (0.014)  (0.428) (0.456) 
per6 0.0073 0.0100  0.0129** 0.0169***  0.0023 0.0023 
 (0.327) (0.199)  (0.013) (0.004)  (0.809) (0.817) 
per7 -0.0096 -0.0099  0.0008 0.0003  -0.0183* -0.0209** 
 (0.197) (0.203)  (0.870) (0.962)  (0.053) (0.040) 
per8 0.0045 0.0053  0.0099* 0.0121**  -0.0004 -0.0022 
 (0.548) (0.497)  (0.055) (0.039)  (0.966) (0.830) 
per9 0.0027 0.0012  0.0081 0.0090  -0.0022 -0.0073 
 (0.722) (0.879)  (0.117) (0.123)  (0.814) (0.469) 
per10 0.0012 -0.0004  0.0068 0.0060  -0.0038 -0.0075 
 (0.877) (0.958)  (0.188) (0.303)  (0.685) (0.458) 
per11 0.0004 0.0002  0.0029 0.0031  -0.0021 -0.0035 
 (0.953) (0.984)  (0.579) (0.590)  (0.827) (0.734) 
per12 -0.0067 -0.0070  -0.0019 -0.0003  -0.0110 -0.0144 
 (0.367) (0.367)  (0.711) (0.963)  (0.245) (0.157) 
per13 0.0041 0.0041  0.0044 0.0040  0.0033 0.0036 
 (0.581) (0.601)  (0.398) (0.499)  (0.725) (0.722) 
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per15 0.0066 0.0081  0.0023 0.0040  0.0093 0.0115 
 (0.373) (0.301)  (0.658) (0.494)  (0.326) (0.259) 
per16 0.0010 0.0062  0.0011 0.0059  0.0002 0.0059 
 (0.896) (0.426)  (0.827) (0.316)  (0.981) (0.558) 
per17 -0.0018 -0.0000  -0.0023 0.0006  -0.0023 -0.0013 
 (0.811) (0.996)  (0.650) (0.916)  (0.807) (0.899) 
per18 0.0112 0.0129*  0.0083 0.0107*  0.0126 0.0145 
 (0.134) (0.099)  (0.109) (0.068)  (0.183) (0.154) 
per19 0.0060 0.0082  0.0050 0.0080  0.0061 0.0079 
 (0.422) (0.294)  (0.331) (0.172)  (0.516) (0.435) 
per20 0.0039 0.0066  0.0070 0.0100*  0.0013 0.0027 
 (0.601) (0.401)  (0.178) (0.087)  (0.894) (0.787) 
per21 0.0252*** 0.0299***  0.0163*** 0.0235***  0.0312*** 0.0354*** 
 (0.001) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) 
per22 0.0001 0.0028  -0.0002 0.0037  -0.0001 0.0016 
 (0.986) (0.723)  (0.966) (0.532)  (0.992) (0.874) 
per23 -0.0047 -0.0028  -0.0041 -0.0016  -0.0048 -0.0040 
 (0.532) (0.715)  (0.430) (0.786)  (0.613) (0.697) 
per24 0.0063 0.0066  0.0011 0.0010  0.0093 0.0113 
 (0.398) (0.400)  (0.826) (0.868)  (0.325) (0.267) 
per25 0.0179** 0.0199**  0.0068 0.0070  0.0249*** 0.0304*** 
 (0.017) (0.011)  (0.189) (0.231)  (0.009) (0.003) 
per26 0.0055 0.0051  -0.0013 -0.0019  0.0096 0.0107 
 (0.465) (0.514)  (0.797) (0.749)  (0.312) (0.293) 
R2 0.1425 0.1638  0.1659 0.2064  0.1618 0.1852 
Table A2 lists the results of OLS regressions with odd lot, pure odd lot, and circumstantial odd lot order imbalance calculated as 
a percentage of volume (OIB) and percentage of trades (TIB) as the dependent variable and 15 minute period of the trading day 
as the dependent variables for trades executed on NASDAQ for all NASDAQ listed stocks occurring from July 2010 through June 
2011.  P-values are in reported in parentheses.  ***, ** & * denote significance at the 1%, 5% & 10% levels, respectively. 
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PURE VERSUS CIRCUMSTANTIAL ODD LOT TRANSACTIONS AND STOCK SPLITS
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3.1 Introduction 
 Stock transactions that execute for less than 100 shares are commonly referred to as 
odd lot trades.  An odd lot trade occurs when the original order is for less than 100 shares, 
which we refer to as a pure odd lot transaction, or an odd lot trade can occur when an order for 
more than 100 shares is broken into multiple transactions and at least one of the transactions 
executes for less than 100 shares, which we refer to as a circumstantial odd lot transactions.  
We study the information contained in pure and circumstantial odd lot transactions.  Prior 
research shows that 100+ share trades contain information (Barclay and Warner, 1993; 
Chakravarty, 2001; and O’Hara, Yao, and Ye, 2011).  O’Hara, Yao, and Ye show that odd lot 
transactions contain information, but do not differentiate between pure and circumstantial odd 
lot transactions.  We will answer whether pure and circumstantial odd lot trades are similar or 
different in information content. 
 We also examine pure and circumstantial odd lot transactions around stock splits.  One 
explanation of stock splits, the trading range hypothesis, has emerged subsequent to the paper 
by Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969), who examines information incorporation into stock 
prices.  This hypothesis states that firms target a particular stock price range for a variety of 
reasons.  One reason is to encourage trading by smaller investors who prior to the split could 
not afford to trade in 100+ shares.  This hypothesis is supported by evidence that small trades 
increase after a stock split (Lipson, 1999; Schultz, 2000; and Desai, Nimalendran, and 
Venkataraman, 1998).  Kryzanowski and Zhang (1996) test the trading range hypothesis with 
data from the Toronto Stock Exchange, which includes odd lot transactions.  Their results show 
odd lot trades decrease and small 100+ share trades increase subsequent to the split.  Our 
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study adds to this area of research by documenting the informativeness of odd lot trades as 
well as the change in the number of odd lot transactions, both pure and circumstantial, before, 
and after the split.   
 Odd lot transactions contain information.  O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2011) find that odd lot 
trades have a weighted price contribution of 27-35%, which is larger than would be explained 
by the proportion of odd lot volume (7%) or by the proportion of odd lot trades (20%).  
However, they did not discern between odd lot trades submitted as odd lot orders and those 
submitted as part of an order for more than 100 shares but executed as multiple trades with 
one being for fewer than 100 shares.  We add to this research by separating the circumstantial 
odd lot trades from the pure odd lot trades and examining the informativeness of each type of 
odd lot trade.  We determine if each group contributes to the informativeness and if so, how 
much information each group of odd lot trades is contributing to informativeness of odd lot 
trades as a whole. 
 We will also study both pure and circumstantial odd lot transactions around stock splits. 
Shultz (2000) and Kadapakkam, Krishnamurthy, and Tse (2005) find strong evidence supporting 
the theory that firms split their stock to attract smaller investors, with both studies finding an 
increase in small trades following a stock split.  Kryzanowski and Zhang (1996), using data from 
the Toronto Stock Exchange that contains odd lot transactions, show that odd lot transactions 
decrease while small 100+ share transactions increase after a stock split.  These results support 
the trading range hypothesis, which asserts that small trades increase after a stock split.  While 
the Kryzanowski and Zhang study includes odd lot transactions, they do not differentiate 
between pure and circumstantial odd lot trades, nor do they investigate the informativeness of 
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odd lot transactions around stock splits.  After a stock split, some trades that would have been 
odd-lot transactions before the split will be 100+ share transactions due to the decrease in 
stock price and 100+ share trades becoming more affordable to traders.  Therefore, we expect 
the some of the information contained in pre-split odd lot transactions to be transferred to 
100+ share transactions post-split, thereby decreasing the price contribution of odd lot 
transactions and increasing the price contribution of 100+ share transactions. 
 
3.2 Hypothesis Development 
 Odd lot transactions, when considered in whole, contain information (O’Hara, Yao, and 
Ye, 2011).  Medium sized transactions contain information (Barclay and Warner, 1993; 
Chakravarty, 2001; and O’Hara, Yao, and Ye), because they are part of a larger informed trade 
that is broken up to avoid signaling the trader’s information to the market (stealth trading).  
Similarly, we assume that some of the information contained in odd lot trades comes from 
medium sized transaction (100-500 shares) that are broken up into smaller trades.  As 
circumstantial odd lots result from multiple partial executions of a 100+ share order, we expect 
circumstantial odd lot trades to have more information than pure odd lot trades because they 
are part of a larger informed trade, until they are broken up into smaller odd lot transactions. 
Hypothesis 1 
H0: The price contribution of circumstantial odd lot transactions is greater than the price 
contribution of pure odd lot transactions. 
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Stock splits lead to an increase in trading activity (Copeland, 1979; Lamoureaux and Poon, 1987; 
and Arnold and Lipson, 1997; and Lipson, 1999).  As a result of the increase in activity, we 
predict that there will be a decrease in the number of circumstantial odd lot transactions post-
split.  A higher level of trading activity increases the likelihood that an order will execute in full 
and lessen the likelihood that an order will be broken up into multiple trades.  Hence, we 
predict a decrease in circumstantial odd lot transactions after a stock split.  
Hypothesis 2 
H0:  There is a decrease in the number of circumstantial odd lot transactions after a stock split. 
 
Consistent with the trading range hypothesis, Kryzanowski and Zhang (1996) show a decrease in 
the number of odd lot transactions after a stock split.  Because the stock is more affordable to 
trade in 100+ share trades, we anticipate a decrease in pure odd lot transactions after a stock 
split. 
Hypothesis 3 
H0: There is a decrease in the number of pure odd lot transactions after a stock split. 
 
We expect, with the decrease in share prices, some pre-split odd lot traders execute 100+ share 
orders post split.  Odd lot transactions, when considered as a whole, contain information 
(O’Hara, Yao, and Ye, 2011) and we expect that some of the information contained in odd lot 
transactions is transferred to small 100+ share transactions after a stock split.  Kryzanowski and 
Zhang (1996) show that the number of odd lot transactions decreases and number of small 
100+ share transactions increases following a stock split.  We expect to see an increase in the 
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information content of small 100+ share transactions and a decrease in the information content 
of odd lot transactions after a stock split.  
Hypothesis 4 
H0: The information content of small 100+ share transactions increases after a stock split.  There 
is also a decrease in the information content of odd lot transactions after the split. 
  
Hypothesis 1 asserts that circumstantial odd lots contain more information than pure odd lot 
transactions, and Hypotheses 2 through 4 assert that the number and information content of all 
odd lot transactions will decrease after a stock split.  However, there is no evidence suggesting 
that the information contained in circumstantial odd lot transactions will decrease more or less 
than the information contained in pure odd lot transactions.  This study will empirically 
determine which group of odd lot transactions loses more information to 100+ share 
transactions after a stock split. 
Hypothesis 5 
H0:  The information content of circumstantial odd lot transactions will decrease more than the 
information content of pure odd lot transactions after a stock split.  
 
3.3 Data 
Our sample consists of all trades in the NASDAQ Historical TotalView ITCH (ITCH) 
database from July 1, 2010 to March 3, 2011.  The ITCH database includes all trades that 
execute on NASDAQ.  We filter our sample to include only stocks that trade at least five times a 
day and at least 1,000 shares every day for all 190 trading days of our sample.  Each stock is also 
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classified as being listed on either the NYSE or NASDAQ exchange.  For our analysis, we only use 
trades that execute during market hours.  Odd-lot trades that are submitted as a single odd-lot 
order and execute in full are denoted as pure odd-lot trades.  Odd-lot trades that are submitted 
as part of a 100+ share order that is subsequently divided into smaller executions, one of which 
is the odd-lot trade, are denoted as circumstantial odd-lot trades.  We use data from the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for closing prices, daily high and low prices, and closing 
ids and asks.  We identify 48 2-for-1 stock splits that occurred during our sample period on 
stocks meeting our minimum volume and number of trades criteria.  We use these 48 stocks as 
our sample for the latter portion of the study regarding stock splits. 
 
3.4 Results 
Table 1 lists summary statistics for our sample.  The average total volume, pure odd-lot 
volume, circumstantial odd-lot volume, total number of trades, total number of pure odd-lot 
trades, total number of circumstantial odd-lot trades, and the proportion of pure and 
circumstantial volume and trades, is reported for all stocks, NASDAQ-listed stocks, and NYSE-
listed stocks.  Table 1 shows preliminary evidence that there are more circumstantial odd-lot 
transactions than pure odd-lot transactions with circumstantial odd-lot transactions comprising 
roughly 4.4% of volume (11.1% of trades) while pure odd-lot transactions comprise roughly 
3.9% of volume (10.7% of trades) for all stocks. 
To test Hypothesis 1, which asserts circumstantial odd-lot transactions contain more 
information than pure odd-lot transactions, we use the Barclay and Warner (1993) calculation 
of price contribution and weighted price contribution.  These calculations measure the 
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proportion of a stock’s daily price change that can be attributed to trades that occur in 
particular trade classes.  Consistent with previous literature (Barclay and Warner, 1993; 
Chakravarty, 2001; and O’Hara, Yao, and Ye, 2011), we define our trade classes to be: less than 
100 shares, 100-500 shares, 501-900 shares, 901-1900 shares, 1901-4900 shares, 4901-9999 
shares, and greater than 10,000 shares.  The less than 100 shares class is further divided into 
pure odd-lot transactions and circumstantial odd-lot transactions, for a total of eight trade 
classes.  We follow Barclay and Warner (1993) in the calculation of price contribution (PC) and 
weighted price contribution (WPC). 
The return on each trade i is calculated as the execution price of the trade less the execution 
price of the previous trade for that stock.  Each trade is categorized into trade class j according 
to the definitions above.  The price contribution, PC, of trade class j for stock s on day t is the 
ratio of the sum of the returns on trades i in class j for stock s on day t to the sum of the returns 
for all trades i for stock s on day t.   
𝑃𝐶𝑗
𝑠,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑟𝑖,𝑗𝑠,𝑡𝑛𝑖=1
∑ 𝑟𝑖
𝑠,𝑡𝑛
𝑖=1
 
The weight, W, for stock s on day t is the ratio of sum of the returns of all trades i in stock s on 
day t to the sum of all trades i in all stocks on day t.   
𝑊𝑠
𝑡 = ∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑠,𝑡𝑛𝑖=1
∑ ∑ 𝑟𝑛𝑖=1 𝑖
𝑠,𝑡𝑛
𝑠=1
 
We calculate the weighted price contribution, WPC, for trade class j on day t as the sum of the 
products of the weight for stock s on day t and the PC of trade class j for stock s on day t for all 
stocks.   
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𝑊𝑃𝐶𝑗
𝑡 =�(𝑛
𝑠=1
𝑊𝑠
𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝐶𝑗
𝑠,𝑡) 
The weighted price contribution WPC for trade class j is the mean of all weighted price 
contributions for trade class j on all days t. 
𝑊𝑃𝐶𝑗 = ∑ 𝑊𝑃𝐶𝑗𝑡𝑛𝑡=1�  
Table 2 reports the weighted price contributions for all trade classes and by exchange 
listing.  Both pure and circumstantial odd-lot transactions have positive weighted price 
contributions across all listing venues.  This finding confirms that both types of odd-lot 
transactions contribute to price formation and are price setting and not price taking trades.  
Pure odd-lot transactions seem to have a larger WPC (17.40% for all stocks), contributing more 
to price formation, than circumstantial odd-lot transactions (8.50% for all stocks), which lends 
preliminary evidence to reject Hypothesis 1, which asserts that circumstantial odd-lot trades 
contribute more to price formation than pure odd-lot trades. 
Table 3 reports the results of the weighted least squares regressions with price 
contribution of trade classes as the dependent variable.  The independent variables are as 
follows: a dummy variable set to one if the trade class is pure odd-lot transactions, and zero 
otherwise; a dummy variable set to one if the trade class is circumstantial odd-lot transactions, 
and zero otherwise; a dummy variable set to one if the trade class is greater than or equal to 
100 shares, and zero otherwise; and the trade class proportion of volume (columns 1, 3 and 5) 
or number of trades (columns 2, 4, and 6).  For the WLS regressions, the observations are 
weighted by the weight calculated in the WPC models: the ratio of the return on stock s on day 
t to the return of the market on day t.  We avoid perfect colinearity issues by suppressing the 
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intercept in the WLS regression.  If pure odd-lot transactions and/or circumstantial odd-lot 
transactions contribute to price formation above their proportion of volume, we expect a 
positive and significant coefficient for the respective <100 shares dummy variable, which is the 
case for pure odd-lot transactions.  For all listing venues and regression equations, the 
coefficient for pure odd-lot trade classes are positive, meaning pure odd-lot transactions 
contribute to price formation above and beyond what would be dictated by their proportion of 
volume and number of trades.  Circumstantial odd-lot transactions contribute to price 
formation above and beyond what would be dictated by their proportion of volume only.  
When proportion of trades is used in the regression equation, the coefficient of the 
circumstantial dummy variable is either significantly negative or not significantly different from 
zero. 
The results in Table 4 formally test Hypothesis 1 in a multivariate environment.  Table 4 
lists the results of regressing the price contribution of trade classes on a dummy variable that 
equals one if the trade class is circumstantial odd-lot trades, a dummy variable equal to one if 
the trade class exceeds 100 shares, and the trade class proportion of volume or trades for each 
stock-day in our sample.  The regression coefficient for the circumstantial odd-lot dummy 
variable is our main variable of interest.  This coefficient measures the impact of circumstantial 
odd-lot trades relative to the pure odd-lot trade class, controlling for proportions of volume and 
trades.  The results are reported for all stocks and by listing venue.  The results show that the 
price contribution of circumstantial odd-lot trades is uniformly less than that of pure odd-lot 
trades with negative coefficients in each of the six regressions.  These results lend strong 
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evidence to reject Hypothesis 1, which asserts circumstantial odd-lot trades contain more price 
setting ability than pure odd-lot trades. 
 Hypotheses 2 through 5 investigate odd-lot transactions and the information content of 
odd-lot transactions before and after a stock split.  For each of our 48 stock splits, we collect 
the mean proportions of odd-lot transactions, pure odd-lot transactions, and circumstantial 
odd-lot transactions relative to total volume and number of trades for 30 days prior to the split 
and 30 days after the split.  We compare the pre-split and post-split proportions to test 
Hypotheses 2 and 3, which assert a decrease in the number of pure and circumstantial odd-lot 
proportions after a stock split.  The results of testing Hypotheses 2 and 3 are reported in Table 
5. 
 Table 5 lists the mean stock-day proportions of odd-lot, pure odd-lot, and circumstantial 
odd-lot proportions of volume and number of trades, both before and after stock splits in our 
sample.  Also listed are results from t-tests testing the differences between the means.  Odd-lot 
proportion, pure odd-lot proportion, and circumstantial odd-lot proportion of volume and 
trades decrease significantly after a stock split.  These results lend univariate evidence that 
supports Hypotheses 2 and 3, which assert there is a decrease in the number of pure and 
circumstantial odd-lot trades after a stock split. 
 Table 6 lists mean proportions of odd-lot, pure odd-lot, and circumstantial odd-lot 
proportions of volume and number of trades by day for the trading week leading up to a stock 
split, and the trading week after a stock split.  As expected, all odd-lot proportions seem to 
decrease in the week following the stock split with a clear delineation on the day of the split, 
which would univariately support Hypotheses 2 and 3, as well. 
   114  
 
 We further investigate Hypotheses 2 and 3 in a multivariate environment by regressing 
stock-day odd-lot proportions on the determinants of odd-lot proportions: price, spread, and 
volatility (O’Hara, Yao, and Ye, 2011) to test if odd-lot proportions decrease more than that 
dictated by changes in their determinants.  We include a dummy variable that equals one if the 
stock-day is in the post-split period and this dummy variable is our variable of interest.  Table 7 
lists the results of the regressions with odd-lot, pure odd-lot, and circumstantial odd-lot 
proportions of volume and number of trades as the dependent variables.  The regression 
coefficients for the post-split dummy variables are uniformly negative, suggesting that all odd-
lot proportions decrease after a stock split while controlling for previously determined factors 
affecting odd-lot proportions.  These results further confirm Hypotheses 2 and 3 and we 
conclude that pure odd-lot transactions and circumstantial odd-lot transactions decrease after 
a stock split.  These results confirm the findings of Kryzanowski and Zhang (1996). 
 Hypothesis 4 postulates that the information content of 100 share transactions 
increases after a stock split and the information content of odd-lot transactions decreases after 
a stock split.  We test this hypothesis by comparing the pre-split mean stock-day price 
contribution and post-split price contribution for each trade class defined earlier as well as a 
ninth class, which denotes trades for exactly 100 shares.  We perform a t-test on the 
differences in the means and report the results in Table 8.  Table 8 shows that the price 
contribution of pure odd-lot transactions increases after a stock split, while the price 
contribution of circumstantial odd-lot transactions and 100 share transactions does not change.  
These results lend univariate evidence that reject Hypotheses 4. 
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 We know that odd-lot proportions and 100 share transaction proportions change after a 
stock split.  Therefore, we test Hypotheses 4 with a multivariate approach that regresses price 
contributions of trade classes for each stock-day on the trade class proportion of volume for the 
stock-day to test if the price contribution of the trade classes changes more than what would 
be dictated by the proportion of volume after a stock split.  We report the results in Table 9. 
In regression 1, we include dummy variables denoting odd-lot trade classes, a dummy 
variable denoting the 100 shares trade class, a dummy variable denoting if the stock-day is 
post-split, interaction terms between the post-split variable and the odd-lot dummy variables, 
and an interaction term between the post-split variable and the 100 share dummy variable.  We 
are particularly interested in the interaction terms as the coefficients of these variables tell us if 
the price contribution of odd-lot and 100 share trades changes after a stock split, while 
controlling for proportions of volume.  Column 1 of Table 9 shows that the price contribution of 
100 share trades does not increase after a stock split, when controlling for proportion of 
volume.  This result rejects Hypothesis 4, as it relates to 100 share trades by showing an 
insignificant interaction term denoting 100 share trades on days after a stock split.  The results 
in Column 1 also reject Hypothesis 4, as it relates to odd-lot trades as well by showing an 
insignificant coefficient for the interaction term denoting odd-lot trades on days after a stock 
split. 
Regression 2 includes dummy variables for pure and circumstantial odd-lot trade 
classes, and interaction terms between the post-split dummy variable and the pure and 
circumstantial trade classes.  The interaction terms relate how the information content of pure 
and circumstantial odd-lot trades is affected by a stock split, while controlling for proportions of 
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volume.  The negative coefficient for the interaction term denoting post-split pure odd-lot 
trades shows that the information content of pure odd-lot trades decreases significantly after a 
stock split.  However, the information content of circumstantial odd-lot transactions does not 
decrease as shown by the insignificant interaction variable.  This result leads us to reject 
Hypothesis 5, which asserts that the information content of circumstantial odd-lot transactions 
decreases more after a stock split than the information content of pure odd-lot transactions. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 This study looks at two areas that are important to our understanding of capital 
markets.  First, we determine the origination of the information content of odd-lot 
transactions.  We show that both pure and circumstantial odd-lot trades contribute to price 
formation, but pure odd-lot trades contribute more than circumstantial odd-lot trades.  This 
result is somewhat counterintuitive.  Previous research assumes that 100+ share trades contain 
more price setting ability than odd-lot trades (O’Hara, Yao, and Ye, 2011).  However, 
circumstantial odd-lot trades are submitted as 100+ share orders, thereby with the same 
information content as 100+ share orders.  Yet, we show that pure odd-lot orders contribute 
more to prices than their circumstantial counterparts. 
 Second, we look at the information content of various trade classes around a stock split.  
Our initial expectation is some of the information contained in odd-lot trades would transfer to 
100+ share trades as the odd-lot trades double in size after a stock split, which we show is the 
case, with price contributions of 100 share trades increasing after a stock split, and the price 
contribution of pure odd-lot trades decreasing after a stock split. 
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics: Average Stock-days 
Variable  All Stocks  NASDAQ  NYSE 
Volume       
Total  335,473.96  280,845.99  377,204.06 
  (1,416,443.35)  (1,029,537.86)  (1,650,823.80) 
       
Pure  5,591.01  4,887.72  6,128.25 
  (12,445.91)  (13,714.20)  (11,352.97) 
       
Circumstantial  8,343.04  8,179.27  8,468.14 
  (18,029.39)  (19,456.85)  (16,856.68) 
       
# Trades       
Total  1,914.65  1,672.55  2,099.58 
  (4,663.71)  (3,956.76)  (5,130.95) 
       
Pure  143.65  132.56  152.11 
  (335.82)  (400.37)  (276.25) 
       
Circumstantial  184.91  186.41  183.75 
  (396.32)  (427.56)  (370.70) 
       
% Pure       
Volume  0.0390  0.0380  0.0397 
  (0.0372)  (0.0375)  (0.0369) 
       
Trades  0.1065  0.1060  0.1068 
  (0.0804)  (0.0817)  (0.0795) 
       
% Circum       
Volume  0.0442  0.0484  0.0410 
  (0.0350)  (0.0376)  (0.0324) 
       
Trades  0.1106  0.1275  0.0977 
  (0.0716)  (0.0814)  (0.0599) 
       
  N=633,080  N=274,170  N=358,910 
Table 1 lists the mean total volume, odd-lot (pure) volume, odd-lot (circumstantial) volume, 
total number of trades, number of odd-lot trades (pure), number of odd-lot trades 
(circumstantial), odd-lot (pure) volume as a proportion of total volume, odd-lot (circumstantial) 
volume as a proportion of total volume, the number of odd-lot (pure) trades as a proportion of 
the total number of trades, and the number of odd-lot (circumstantial) trades as a proportion of 
the total number of trades calculated from all trades executed on NASDAQ for all stocks, 
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NASDAQ-listed stocks, and NYSE-listed stocks for July 2010 through March 2011. N denotes the 
number of stock-days used to calculate the averages for each category. Standard deviations are 
reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.  Weighted Price Contribution  
Trade Class  All  NASDAQ  NYSE 
<100 Shares, Pure  0.1740  0.1841  0.1642 
       
<100 Shares, Circum  0.0850  0.1253  0.0590 
       
100-500  0.7119  0.6551  0.7523 
       
501-900  0.0132  0.0152  0.0116 
       
901-1,901  0.0108  0.0133  0.0090 
       
1,901-4,901  0.0040  0.0054  0.0031 
       
4,901-9,999  0.0008  0.0010  0.0006 
       
<10,000  0.0004  0.0006  0.0002 
Table 2 lists the weighted price contribution for seven trade classes: less than 100 shares 
(pure), less than 100 shares (circumstantial), 100 to 500 shares, 501 to 900 shares, 901 to 1900 
shares, 1901 to 4900 shares, 4901 to 9999 shares, and over 10,000 shares for trades occurring 
on NASDAQ from July 2010 through March 2011, for all stocks, NASDAQ-listed stocks, and 
NYSE-listed stocks. 
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Table 3.  Weighted Least Squares Regression: PC on Trade Class and Proportion of Volume 
Variable  All Stocks  NASDAQ  NYSE 
Trade Class          
<100 Shares, Pure  0.1300*** 0.0497***  0.1435*** 0.0652***  0.1169*** 0.0364*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
<100 Shares, Circum  0.0357*** -0.0318***  0.0754*** 0.0006  0.0105*** -0.0511*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.766)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
100+ Shares  -0.0270*** 0.0076***  -0.0234*** 0.0066***  -0.0288*** 0.0091*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
% Volume  0.9167***   0.8547***   0.9576***  
  (<.0001)   (<.0001)   (<.0001)  
          
% Trades   0.9590***   0.9137***   0.9875*** 
   (<.0001)   (<.0001)   (<.0001) 
          
R2  0.1091 0.1132  0.0841 0.0888  0.1307 0.1338 
Table 3 lists the results of weighted least squares regressions with price contribution (PC) of trade classes as the dependent 
variable and the ratio of daily stock returns to daily market returns as the weight.  The independent variables are a dummy set 
to one if the trade class is less than 100 shares (pure) and zero otherwise, a dummy variable set to one if the trade class is less 
than 100 shares (circumstantial) and zero otherwise, a dummy variable set to one if the trade class is greater than 100 shares 
and zero otherwise, the trade class proportion of volume in columns one, three, and five, and the trade class proportion of 
trades in columns two, four, and six for all stocks, NASDAQ-listed stocks, and NYSE-listed stocks for trades occurring July 2010 
through March 2011.  P-values are reported in parentheses.  ***, ** & * denote significance at the 1%, 5% & 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 4.  Price Contribution: Pure Odd-lot vs. Circumstantial Odd-Lot 
Variable  All Stocks  NASDAQ  NYSE 
Intercept  0.0942*** 0.0301***  0.1169*** 0.0569***  0.0764*** 0.0095* 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.0857) 
          
<100 Shares, Circum  -0.0545*** -0.0538***  -0.0345*** -0.0444***  -0.0685*** -0.0586*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
          
100+ Shares  -0.1277*** -0.0190***  -0.1470*** -0.0440***  -0.1106*** 0.0011 
  (<.0001) (0.001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.8686) 
          
% Volume  0.9557***   0.8808***   1.0060***  
  (<.0001)   (<.0001)   (<.0001)  
          
% Trades   0.9455***   0.8743***   0.9950*** 
   (<.0001)   (<.0001)   (<.0001) 
          
R2  0.0055 0.0059  0.0035 0.0038  0.0080 0.0084 
Table 4 lists the results of OLS regressions with price contribution (PC) of trade classes as the dependent variable and a dummy 
set to one if the trade class is less than 100 shares (circumstantial) and zero otherwise, a dummy variable set to one if the trade 
class is greater than 100 shares and zero otherwise, the trade class proportion of volume in columns one, three, and five, and 
the trade class proportion of trades in columns two, four, and six for all stocks, NASDAQ-listed stocks, and NYSE-listed stocks for 
trades occurring July 2010 through March 2011.  P-values are reported in parentheses.  ***, ** & * denote significance at the 
1%, 5% & 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5.  Odd-lot Proportions, Pre and Post Stock Split 
Variable Pre-Split Post-Split Diff (Pre-Post) 
Volume Odd 0.1391 0.0994 0.0397*** 
    (0.000) 
     
 Pure 0.0622 0.0422 0.0200*** 
    (0.000) 
     
 Circumstantial 0.0769 0.0572 0.0197*** 
    (0.000) 
     
Number of Trades Odd 0.3141 0.2431 0.0709*** 
    (0.000) 
     
 Pure 0.1619 0.1169 0.0450*** 
    (0.000) 
     
 Circumstantial 0.1522 0.1262 0.0260*** 
    (0.000) 
Table 5 lists the mean proportion of odd-lot, pure odd-lot, and circumstantial odd-lot volume 
and number of trades for all trades occurring on the NASDAQ exchange before and after a stock 
split and the differences between the means for stock splits occurring between January 1, 2009 
and June 30, 2011.  P-values are reported in parentheses.  ***, ** & * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5% & 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6.  Odd-Lot Proportions Pre and Post Stock Split by Day 
  Volume  Number of Trades 
Day  Odd Pure Circum  Odd Pure Circum 
-5  0.1437 0.0626 0.0810  0.3221 0.1665 0.1556 
         
-4  0.1620 0.0819 0.0801  0.3362 0.1824 0.1538 
         
-3  0.1425 0.0648 0.0777  0.3190 0.1712 0.1478 
         
-2  0.1539 0.0759 0.0780  0.3369 0.1834 0.1535 
         
-1  0.1529 0.0661 0.0868  0.3379 0.1692 0.1687 
         
1  0.1035 0.0404 0.0632  0.2489 0.1138 0.1351 
         
2  0.0902 0.0353 0.0549  0.2267 0.1078 0.1189 
         
3  0.0958 0.0410 0.0548  0.2372 0.1117 0.1256 
         
4  0.0957 0.0388 0.0569  0.2428 0.1169 0.1259 
         
5  0.0931 0.0394 0.0538  0.2315 0.1105 0.1210 
Table 6 lists the mean proportion of odd-lot, pure odd-lot, and circumstantial odd-lot volume 
and number of trades for all trades occurring on the NASDAQ exchange for the five trading days 
before and five trading days after a stock split for stock splits occurring between January 1, 
2009 and June 30, 2011. 
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Table 7.  Regression Results: Odd-lot Proportions on Determinants 
  Proportion of Volume  Proportion of Trades 
Variable  Odd Pure Circum  Odd Pure Circum 
Intercept  0.1500*** 0.0616*** 0.0884***  0.3218*** 0.1418*** 0.1801*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
Post  -0.0420*** -0.0192*** -0.0228***  -0.0701*** -0.0342*** -0.0360*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
Price($)  0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*  0.0005*** 0.0006*** -0.0001 
  (0.002) (0.005) (0.071)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.326) 
         
Spread(%)  -1.5183*** 0.5192 -2.0375***  -2.0982** 0.6015 -2.6997*** 
  (0.007) (0.232) (0.000)  (0.019) (0.381) (0.000) 
         
Range($)  -0.0131*** -0.0059*** -0.0073***  -0.0228*** -0.0127*** -0.0102*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
R2  0.1057 0.0400 0.1204  0.1210 0.0775 0.0901 
Table 7 lists the results of OLS regressions with stock-day odd-lot, pure odd-lot, and circumstantial odd-lot proportions of 
volume and number of trades as the dependent variables using all trades that occur on the NASDAQ exchange for 30 trading 
days before and 30 trading days after a stock split for stocks that had a 2-for1 split between July 1, 2010 and June 31, 2012.  The 
independent variables are a dummy variable set to one if the stock-day is after a stock split and zero otherwise, the stock closing 
price, the closing spread as a percentage of the midpoint, and the daily trading range.  P-values are reported in parentheses.  
***, ** & * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% & 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 8.  Price Contribution by Trade Class, Pre and Post Stock Split 
Trade Class  Pre  Post  Diff (Pre-Post) 
Odd, Pure  0.2856  0.1418  0.1438** 
      (0.050) 
       
Odd, Circumstantial  0.0452  0.0657  -0.0205 
      (0.743) 
       
100 Shares  0.5565  0.6370  -0.0805 
      (0.320) 
       
101 to 500 Shares  0.0643  0.1358  -0.0715 
      (0.182) 
       
501 to 900 Shares  -0.0111  0.0159  -0.027 
      (0.366) 
       
901 to 1,900 Shares  0.0111  0.0050  0.0061 
      (0.840) 
       
1,901 to 4,900 Shares  -0.0413  0.0110  -0.0522* 
      (0.085) 
       
4,901 to 9,999 Shares  0.0087  -0.0011  0.0098 
      (0.635) 
       
Over 10,000 Shares  0.0275  -0.0092  0.0366** 
      (0.025) 
Table 8 lists the mean pre-split price contribution, the mean post-split price contribution, and 
the difference between the pre-split and post-split price contribution for nine trade classes: less 
than 100 shares (pure), less than 100 shares (circumstantial), 100 shares, 101 to 500 shares, 
501 to 900 shares, 901 to 1900 shares, 1901 to 4900 shares, 4901 to 9999 shares, and over 
10,000 shares for trades occurring on NASDAQ in stocks with a 2-for-1 split occurring from July 
2010 through March 2011.  P-values are reported in parentheses.  ***, ** & * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% & 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9.  Regression Results: Price Contribution on Proportion of Volume 
Variable (1) (2) 
Intercept -0.0376 -0.0688*** 
 (0.184) (0.010) 
Odd 0.1615***  
 (0.000)  
Pure  0.2947*** 
  (0.000) 
Circumstantial  0.0367 
  (0.439) 
100 Shares 0.2291***  
 (0.002)  
Post 0.0240 0.0468 
 (0.507) (0.129) 
Post*Odd -0.0737  
 (0.185)  
Post*Pure  -0.1716*** 
  0.010  
Post*Circumstantial  -0.0067 
  (0.920) 
Post*100 Shares 0.0875  
 (0.209)  
Proportion of Volume 0.5811*** 0.9631*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
R2 0.0221 0.0221 
Table 9 lists the results of OLS regressions with price contribution of stock-day trade classes as 
the dependent variable for 30 trading days before and 30 trading day after a stock split for 
stocks that had a 2-for1 split between July 1, 2010 and June 31, 2011.  The independent 
variables are a dummy variable set to one if the trade class is an odd-lot trade class and zero 
otherwise, a dummy variable set to one if the trade class is 100 shares and zero otherwise, a 
dummy variable set to one if the stock-day is after a stock split and zero otherwise, an 
interaction term between post and odd, an interaction term between post and 100 shares, and 
the trade class proportion of volume in regression 1; a dummy variable set to one if the trade 
class is less than 100 shares (odd) and zero otherwise, a dummy variable set to one if the trade 
class is less than 100 shares (circumstantial) and zero otherwise, a dummy variable set to one if 
the stock-day is after a stock split and zero otherwise, an interaction term between post and 
pure, an interaction term between post and circumstantial, and the trade class proportion of 
volume.  P-values are reported in parentheses.  ***, ** & * denote significance at the 1%, 5% & 
10% levels, respectively.
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